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u.s army war college guide to national security issues volume i theory of war and strategy 3rd edition revised and expanded edited by j boone bartholomees jr department of national security and strategy june 2008 visit our website for other free publication downloads http www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil to rate this publication click here this publication is a work of the united states government as defined in title 17 united states code section 101 as such it is in the public domain and under the provisions of title 17 united states code section 105 it may not be copyrighted.

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the views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the u.s army war college the department of the army the department of defense or the u.s government this report is cleared for public release distribution is unlimited the department of state public affairs office reviewed the manuscript for chapter 13 and poses no objection to its publication the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the department of state comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to director strategic studies institute u.s army war college 122 forbes ave carlisle pa 17013-5244 all strategic studies institute ssi publications are available on the ssi homepage for electronic dissemination hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our homepage ssi s homepage address is www.strategicstudiesinstitute army.mil the strategic studies institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts recent and forthcoming publications and upcoming conferences sponsored by the institute each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts if you are interested in receiving this newsletter please subscribe on our homepage at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/newsletter isbn 1-58487-356-6 ii

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contents volume i theory of war and strategy introduction j boone bartholomees jr vii i strategic theory 1 1 why is strategy difficult david jablonsky 3 2 a survey of the theory of strategy j boone bartholomees jr 13 3 toward a theory of strategy art lykke and the u.s army war college strategy model harry r yarger 43 4 the strategic appraisal the key to effective strategy harry r yarger 51 5 managing strategic risk james f holcomb 65 6 a theory of victory j boone bartholomees jr 79 7 toward a strategic theory of terrorism defining boundaries in the ongoing search for security frank l jones 95 8 landpower in traditional theory and contemporary application g k cunningham 107 9 thucydides and contemporary strategy r craig nation 129 ii the elements of power 143 10 national power david jablonsky 145 11 national power r craig nation 163 12 strategic communication wielding the information element of power dennis m murphy 175 13 diplomacy as an instrument of national power reed j fendrick 189 14 theory and practice of modern diplomacy origins and development to 1914 louis j nigro jr 195 15 military power and the use of force john f troxell 209 16 political economy and national security a primer janeen m klinger 235 17 economics a key element of national power clayton k s chun 249 iii

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iii strategic issues and considerations 261 18 air power theory an analytical narrative from the first world war to the present tami davis biddle 263 19 john warden s five ring model and the indirect approach to war clayton k s chun 295 20 spacepower a strategic assessment and a way forward jeffrey a farnsworth 309 21 network-centric warfare leveraging the power of information jeffrey l groh 323 appendix i contributors 339 iv

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figures volume i chapter 1 figure 1 figure 2 figure 3 figure 4 figure 5 figure 6 the policy continuum 4 the remarkable trinity 5 the impact of technology 5 the continuum of war 8 national strategy the horizontal plane 9 national strategy and the vertical continuum of war 9 chapter 3 figure 1 strategic and operational art 45 figure 2 comprehensiveness of strategy 46 figure 3 the lykke model 46 chapter 4 figure 1 figure 2 figure 3 figure 4 figure 5 strategic appraisal process 52 realms of strategy 53 levels of intensity 56 strategic factors 56 strategic thinking competencies 59 chapter 5 figure 1 value and cost/risk factors 69 chapter 6 figure 1 scale of success 82 figure 2 scale of decisiveness 83 figure 3 scale of achievement 83 chapter 8 figure 1 the range of effectiveness of military options 118 figure 2 responsibilities of a theater army in joint and combined operations 122 chapter 10 figure 1 gain and risk assessment 157 chapter 15 figure 1 figure 2 figure 3 figure 4 figure 5 components of security policy 211 evaluations of compellent threats 214 range of military operations 216 guidelines for the use of force 219 weinburger doctrine from vietnam to iraq 222 v

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chapter 16 figure 1 shares in the world economy 240 chapter 19 figure 1 five ring model 299 chapter 21 figure 1 the network centric operations conceptual framework 326 figure 2 tenets of ncw and the value 328 vi

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introduction j boone bartholomees jr the u s army war college guide usawc to national security issues is the latest edition of the u s army war college guide to national security policy and strategy which the college has published sporadically under different titles since 2001 this edition of the guide is in two volumes that correspond roughly to the two core courses that the department of national security and strategy dnss teaches theory of war and strategy and national security policy and strategy like its predecessors this edition is largely an expansion of the existing materials although over 40 percent is new and the previously published chapters have been updated as necessary the authors with one exception all current or former members of the faculty represent each of the four primary teaching departments of the college the exception is the inclusion this year of a chapter on space power by a recent graduate the chapter was his research project while a student the appendix on the usawc strategy formulation model in the second volume reflects the alterations in that fundamental document made for the 2008 academic year 2007-08 although dnss uses several of the chapters in this volume as readings for its core courses and at least one other department uses chapters in its core instruction this is not a textbook it does reflect however both the method and manner we use to teach the theory of war and the formulation of national security strategy to america s future senior leaders as we continue to refine and update the guide we intend to increase course-oriented essays and several of the new chapters were written specifically to support instruction the book is also not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either the theory of war strategy or the policymaking process the guide is organized in broad clusters of chapters addressing general subject areas chapters are placed in general blocks for convenience not as a rigid framework i made no effort to constrain or shape the authors work based on where i saw the chapter fitting in the book thus some chapters might have been placed in several blocks and their presence in a specific block should not be considered a restrictive form of categorization volume i starts with theoretical issues on war and strategy the second block examines power both conceptually and in terms of the elements of power the volume concludes with studies on specific theoretical issues the second volume on national security strategy and policy opens with a look at the u.s security community and its functions the second block expands to multinational issues and considerations the volume concludes with studies of specific policy issues or considerations vii

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part i strategic theory

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chapter 1 why is strategy difficult david jablonsky colonel ret arthur lykke taught an entire generation of u.s army war college students that strategy at any level consists of ends or objectives ways or concepts and means or resources this three-element framework is nothing more than a reworking of the traditional definition of strategy as the calculated relationship of ends and means yet the student response is always overwhelmingly favorable with lykke s framework invariably forming the structure for subsequent seminar problems on subjects ranging from the u.s civil war to nuclear strategy this is due in part to the fact that students weaned on the structural certitude of the five-paragraph field order and the commander s estimate naturally find such structure comforting in dealing with the complexities of strategy but those students also know from their experience in the field that there are limits to the scientific approach when dealing with human endeavors as a consequence they can also appreciate the art of mixing ends ways and means using for each element the part subjective part objective criteria of suitability feasibility and applicability the essence of strategic calculation.1 the ends-ways-means paradigm also provides a structure at all levels of strategy to avoid confusing the scientific product with the scientific process the former involves production propositions that are logically related and valid across time and space the search for these immutable principles over the centuries by students of war failed because they looked at classical strategy as something like physical science that could produce verities in accordance with certain regularities this was further compounded by military thinkers who made claims for scientific products without subjecting those products to a scientific process both jomini and mahan for instance ignored evidence in cases that did not fit their theories or principles of strategy.2 the strategic paradigm then serves as a lowest common denominator reminder that a true scientific product is not possible from the study of strategy at the same time however that paradigm provides a framework for the systematic treatment of facts and evidence the very essence of the scientific process in this regard admiral wylie has pointed out i do not claim that strategy is or can be a science in the sense of the physical sciences it can and should be an intellectual discipline of the highest order and the strategist should prepare himself to manage ideas with precision and clarity and imagination thus while strategy itself may not be a science strategic judgment can be scientific to the extent that it is orderly rational objective inclusive discriminatory and perceptive.3 all that notwithstanding the limitations of the strategic paradigm bring the focus full circle back to the art involved in producing the optimal mix of ends ways and means strategy of course does depend on the general regularities of that paradigm but strategy does not always obey the logic of that framework remaining as the german army regulations truppen-fuhrung of 1936 described it a free creative activity resting upon scientific foundations 4 the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate why despite increasingly scientific approaches to formulation and implementation strategy remains principally an art rather than a science and why within that art the creative activity of blending the elements in the strategic paradigm has become progressively more difficult over the centuries from revolutions to total war in the wake of the napoleonic wars there was a growing recognition of the increased complexity of strategy summarized in karl von clausewitz s warning that there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue nor of a purely military scheme to solve it 5 3

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at the tactical level the prussian philosopher wrote the means are fighting forces trained for combat the end is victory for policy the strategic however clausewitz concluded that military victories were meaningless unless they were the means to obtain a political end those objects which lead directly to peace 6 thus strategy was the linking together verbindung of separate battle engagements into a single whole for the final object of the strategy war 7 and only the political or policy level could determine that objective to bring a war or any one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy he pointed out on that level strategy and policy coalesce 8 for clausewitz this vertical continuum see figure 1 was best tactics exemplified by frederick the great who embodied both policy and strategy and whose silesian conquests of 1741 are considered to be the classic example of strategic art by demonstrating an element of restrained strength ready to adjust to the smallest shift in the political situation 9 figure 1 with his deceptively simple description of the vertical the policy continuum continuum of war clausewitz set the stage for the equivalent of a copernican shift in the strategic ends-ways-means paradigm now that paradigm was more complex operating on both the military and policy levels with the totality of the ends ways and means at the lower levels interconnected with the political application at the policy level of those same strategic elements this connection was the essence of clausewitz s description of war as a continuation of political intercourse verkehr with the addition of other means he explained that we deliberately use the phrase with the addition of other means because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different the main lines along which military events progress and to which they are restricted are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace war cannot be divorced from political life and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.10 the industrial and french revolutions this growing complexity in dealing with the strategic paradigm was compounded by two upheavals clausewitz was profoundly aware of one the french revolution he was totally ignorant of the other the industrial/technological revolution prior to the french revolution 18th-century rulers had acquired such effective political and economic control over their people that they were able to create their war machines as separate and distinct from the rest of society the revolution changed all that with the appearance of a force that beggared all imagination as clausewitz described it suddenly war again became the business of the people a people of 30 millions all of whom considered themselves to be citizens there seemed no end to the resources mobilized all limits disappeared in the vigor and enthusiasm shown by governments and their subjects war untrammelled by any conventional restraints had broken loose in all its elemental fury this was due to the peoples new share in these great affairs of state and their participation in its turn resulted partly from the impact that the revolution had on the internal conditions of every state and partly from the danger that france posed to everyone.11 4

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government for clausewitz the people greatly complicated the formulation and implementation of strategy by adding primordial violence hatred and enmity which are to be regarded as a blind natural force to form with the army and the government what he termed the remarkable trinity see figure 2 the army he saw as a creative spirit roaming freely within the play of chance and probability but always bound to the government the third element in subordination as an instrument of policy which makes it subject to reason alone 12 it was the complex totality of this trinity that military people clausewitz realized had altered and complicated strategy so completely figure 2 the remarkable trinity clearly the tremendous effects of the french revolution were caused not so much by new military methods and concepts as by radical changes in policies and administration by the new character of government altered conditions of the french people and the like it follows that the transformation of the art of war resulted from the transformation of politics.13 but while that transformation had made it absolutely essential to consider the elements of the clausewitzian trinity within the strategic paradigm the variations possible in the interplay of those elements moved strategy even farther from the realm of scientific certitude a theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them clausewitz warned in this regard would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless 14 like most of his contemporaries clausewitz had government no idea that he was living on the eve of a technological transformation born of the industrial revolution but that transformation as it gathered momentum throughout the remainder of the 19th century fundamentally altered the interplay of elements within the clausewitzian trinity further complicating the formulation and application process within the strategic paradigm see figure 3 technology in terms of the military element technology would change the basic nature of weapons and modes of transportation the former had been stable for a hundred military people years the latter for a thousand within a decade of clausewitz s death in 1831 that process would begin in armaments with the introduction of breechloading figure 3 the impact of technology firearms and in transportation with the development of the railroads 15 technology had a more gradual effect on the role of the people there were for example the great european population increases of the 19th century as the industrial revolution moved on to the continent from great britain this trend led in turn to urbanization the mass movement of people from the extended families of rural life to the atomized impersonal life of the city there the urge to belong to find a familial substitute led to a more focused allegiance to the nation-state manifested in a new more blatant and aggressive nationalism this nationalism was fueled by the progressive side effects of the industrial revolution particularly in the area of public education which meant in turn mass literacy throughout europe by the end of the 19th century one result was that an increasingly literate public could be manipulated 5

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by governments as technology spawned more sophisticated methods of mass communications on the other hand those same developments also helped democratize societies which then demanded a greater share in government particularly over strategic questions involving war and peace in clausewitz s time strategic decisions dealing with such matters were rationally based on realpolitik considerations to further state interests not on domestic issues by the end of the 19th century the rankeian primat der aussenpolitik was increasingly challenged throughout europe by the need of governments for domestic consensus a development with far-reaching implications for the conduct of strategy at the national level within the basic ends-ways-means paradigm.16 during much of that century as the social and ideological upheavals unleashed by the french revolution developed military leaders in europe generally attempted to distance their armed forces from their people nowhere was this more evident than in the prussian cum german military where the leaders worked hard over the years to prevent the adulteration of their forces by liberal ideas the army is now our fatherland general von roon wrote to his wife during the 1848 revolutions for there alone have the unclean and violent elements who put everything into turmoil failed to penetrate 17 the revolutions in industry and technology however rendered this ideal unattainable to begin with the so-called technisierung of warfare meant the mass production of more complex weapons and forever-larger standing military forces the key ingredients for these forces were the great population increases and the rise of nationalism as well as improved communications and governmental efficiency the latter directed at general conscription of national manhood which thanks to progress in railroad development could be brought to the battlefield in unlimited numbers at the same time this increased interaction between the government/military and the people was also tied to other aspects of the impact of technology on the clausewitzian trinity technological innovations in weaponry during this period for example were not always followed by an understanding of their implications societal as well as military certainly there was the inability on the part of all european powers to perceive the growing advantage of defensive over offensive weapons demonstrated in the boer and russo-japanese wars that inability was tied in with a trend in europe at the time to combine elan with a military focus on moral force bloodshed and decisive battles the result was that the military leaders of france germany and russia all adopted offensive military doctrines in some form.18 the fact that these doctrines led to the self-defeating offensive strategies of world war i ultimately had to do with the transformation of civil-military relations within the clausewitzian trinity in their countries in france as an example the officer corps distrusted the trend by the leaders of the third republic toward shorter terms of military service which it believed threatened the army s professional character and tradition adopting an offensive doctrine and elevating it to the highest level was a means to combat this trend since there was general agreement that an army consisting primarily of reservists and short-term conscripts could only be used in the defense reserves are so much eyewash one french general wrote at the time and take in only shortsighted mathematicians who equate the value of armies with the size of their effectives without considering their moral value 19 although these were setbacks for those who shared this sentiment in the wake of the dreyfus affair and the consequent military reforms it only required the harsher international climate after the agadir crisis of 1911 for general joffre and his young turks to gain the ascendancy their philosophy was summed up by their leader who explained that in planning for the next war he had no preconceived idea other than a full determination to take the offensive with all my forces assembled 20 under these circumstances french offensive doctrine became increasingly unhinged from strategic reality as it responded to the more immediate demands of domestic and intragovernmental 6

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politics the result was france s illconceived strategic lunge in 1914 toward its former possessions in the east a lunge that almost provided sufficient margin of assistance for germany s schlieffen plan to work another result of military operational doctrine driving policy in the end only the miracle of the marne prevented a victory for the germans as rapid and complete as that of 1870.21 there were other equally significant results as the full brunt of technological change continued to alter the relationship between the elements of the clausewitzian trinity in all the european powers the larger more complex armies resulted in the growing specialization and compartmentalization of the military a trend that culminated in the emulation of the german general staff system by most of the european powers it is significant that clausewitz had ignored carnot the organizer of victory for napoleon when considering military genius now with the increase in military branches as well as combat service and combat service support organizations the age of the militaryorganizational genius had arrived all this in turn affected the relationship in all countries between the military and the government for the very increase in professional knowledge and skill caused by technology s advance in military affairs undermined the ability of political leaders to understand and control the military just as technology was making that control more important than ever by extending strategy from the battlefield to the civilian rear thus blurring the difference between combatant and noncombatant.22 at the same time the military expansion in the peacetime preparation for war began to enlarge the economic dimensions of conflict beyond the simple financial support of clausewitz s era as europe entered the 20th century new areas of concern began to emerge ranging from industrial capacity and the availability and distribution of raw materials to research and development of weapons and equipment all this in turn increased the size and role of the european governments prior to world war i with the result as william james perceptively noted that the intensely sharp competitive preparation for war by the nation is the real war permanently increasing so that the battles are only a sort of public verification of mastery gained during the `peace intervals 23 nevertheless the full impact of the government s strategic role in terms of national instruments of power beyond that of the military was generally not perceived in europe despite some of the more salient lessons of the american civil war in that conflict the south lost because its strategic means did not match its strategic ends and ways consequently no amount of operational finesse on the part of the south s great captains could compensate for the superior industrial strength and manpower that the north could deploy ultimately this meant for the north as michael howard has pointed out that the operational skills of their adversaries were rendered almost irrelevant 24 the civil war also illustrated another aspect of the changes within the strategic paradigm the growing importance of the national will of the people in achieving political as well as military strategic objectives that social dimension of strategy on the part of the union was what prevented the early southern operational victories from being strategically decisive and what ultimately allowed the enormous industrial-logistical potential north of the potomac to be realized the revolutions joined the age of total wars strategy changed irrevocably with the full confluence in world war i of the trends set in train by the industrial and french revolutions in particular the technology in that war provided as hanson baldwin has pointed out a preview of the pandora s box of evils that the linkage of science with industry in the service of war was to mean 25 how unexpected the results of that linkage could be was illustrated by a young british subaltern s report to his commanding general after one of the first british attacks in flanders sorry sir he concluded we didn t know it would be like that we ll do better next time 26 7

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