Vox Collegii Vol XV

 

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NDC Magazine Vox Collegii Volume XV , Volume 15 July 17

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CONTENTS Editorial A Deep Insight: NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: THE COMMANDANT’S VIEW by Ms Nadja El Fertasi and Ms Diana De Vivo NATO’S FUTURE: A POLITICAL VIEW by Dr Michael Rühle NATO AND THE WPS AGENDA: ON THE ROAD TOWARDS “MISSION ACHIEVED” by Ms Daisy Bisoffi Life at the College: 10th ANNIVERSARY OF THE NDC RESEARCH DIVISION 2007-2017 by Ms Alessandra Giada Dibenedetto Highlights: Our Courses World News Our Publications 2 3 7 12 17 24 27 29 Editor-in-Chief: LtCol Camillo della Nebbia (ITA A) Editor: Giuseppina Visciano (ITA C) Assistant Editors: Marco Maria Medardo Marcucci (ITA C) Francisco J. Marin-Barrena (ESP C) Proof-reading: Caroline Curta (FRA C) Peter G. Mead (GBR C) Photography: NATO and Allied Armed Forces’ social websites NDC Reproductions Section Graphic Design & Printing: Grafich Communication S.r.l. (Fondi -LT-)

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The Editorial Vox Collegii Dear Reader, First and foremost, thank you for your continuing support of Vox Collegii and please let me introduce myself as the newly appointed (March 2017) Head of the NDC Public Affairs Office. Being here offers me a special opportunity to continue my personal and professional  commitment to the Alliance, just after completing a very rewarding ‘boots on the ground’ experience  in Kosovo (KFORHQ), where I became Deputy Chief of the Public Affairs Office in August 2016. After careful thought about how best to complement the journal’s many excellent features, I have decided to include a new section entitled “World News”.  The focus here will be on events with a particular significance for the Alliance during the last six months. This time, I would like to highlight two items of obvious interest to NATO as a whole – and to our many friends around the world. The first is the accession of Montenegro to the North Atlantic Organization, as the 29th member state. This is a further step towards enhancing security, cohesiveness and trust, not only within NATO but worldwide. I am certainly voicing the thoughts of the entire NDC staff when I say how greatly I look forward to meeting the first Montenegrin attendees and delegations here at the College. As a second focal point, the NATO Heads of State and Government meeting in Brussels on 25th May confirmed the Alliance’s  commitment to the fight against terrorism and the ‘fair burden sharing’ policy. This was a key event for the international community. Thanks to the reassurances delivered by many of the Alliance’s Heads of State, an even stronger commitment in this direction has been affirmed. Europe and the Alliance have had to cope with an alarming spate of terrorist attacks, the aim of which is to undermine our traditions, cultural heritage and overall sense of security. The need to deal firmly with those responsible for such attacks is rightly acknowledged as a fundamental priority for the Alliance. It is with gratitude that I acknowledge the excellence of my team at the Public Affairs Office, whose contribution to this publication and to the exceptionally demanding workload of the last few months reflects the highest level of professional and personal commitment. I wish you all 'Buona lettura!' as you take time to peruse this fifteenth issue of Vox Collegii, which I hope will give you a better understanding of the broader NATO and NDC environment. Finally, I would like to express my  deepest appreciation to the newly  appointed Commandant, LtGen Chris Whitecross, together with best wishes from all of us at Vox Collegii for everything that lies ahead during her mandate here at the College. I trust that all our readers will find this issue enjoyable and thought provoking. Lieutenant Colonel Camillo della Nebbia Italian Army, Head Public Affairs Office 2

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Volume XV A Deep Insight NATO Defense College Global Engagement Strategy – The Commandant’s view Nadja EL Fertasi and Diana De Vivo Nadja EL Fertasi is Stakeholder Engagement Senior Executive Coordinator in the NATO Communications & Information Agency. She is responsible for developing and maintaining close engagement with key stakeholders, ensuring that the General Manager’s position on key issues is accurately presented and stakeholders’ positions clearly understood. Nadja holds a Master of International Relations degree from the University of Cambridge and is an Alumna of the NATO-wide Executive Development Programme. She has a passion for international relations, security studies and politics. Fluent in Dutch, English, French and Arabic, she is also proficient in Italian and German. Nadja has been awarded a place on the Marshall Memorial Fellowship 2018, which is the German Marshall Fund’s flagship leadership development programme. Diana De Vivo is currently working in the Executive Management team of the NATO Communications & Information Agency, where she is responsible for supporting the General Manager and the Chief of Staff with internal governance and decision-making. Diana, who holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and Politics, has worked at the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Italian Delegation to NATO, and JFC Naples. Fluent in Italian, English and French, she also has a good working knowledge of Spanish. Diana is currently completing a PhD on international cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism, at Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and must not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 1. QUESTION: (Lieutenant) General, you have followed an impressive career path in the Royal Canadian Air Force. Appointed to the NATO Defense College in November 2016, how do you see the role of the College in promoting education as an essential pillar of the Alliance’s security and stability? The NATO Defense College (NDC) is an educational institution. It provides a stimulating venue for senior leaders across the political, military and civilian sectors to come together. These future leaders get to learn about NATO, the Alliance and the security environment – not only to facilitate collaboration today, but to help shape our future. We also work with NATO partners, which offers a unique and invaluable opportunity to gain better insight into their interests and concerns. The real strength of the NDC is that education leads to the ability to shape consensus-building and develop common solutions to the same challenges we all face. This is critical in providing the best response when facing complex challenges in an unpredictable security environment. 2. QUESTION: You saw yourself as a “leader” for the first time when you joined the “Cadet” movement in High School. continued overleaf... 3

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A Deep Insight Vox Collegii Could you please highlight some major achievements during your time in leadership positions with the Royal Canadian Air Force? I have had some great opportunities, as a leader, as a woman, as an engineer and as a parent. This unique environment of the Canadian Armed Forces has provided me with opportunities to deploy to operational environments, such as Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to work in my field, and also outside my area of expertise. For example, although I had an engineering background, I was given the opportunity to work in Strategic Communications when I was deployed in Afghanistan. In my last job, as the Commander of the Military Personnel Command, I dealt with education and training, recruitment, diversity and gender parity. I also helped in other fields, such as health services. This broad range of professional experiences has enriched my professional background and balanced my career in many respects. For these reasons, I am very grateful to the Canadian Armed Forces. QUOTE by DSG Rose Gottemoeller “As NATO continues to adapt to the evolving security landscape, training future leaders to deal with these challenges and their increasing complexity is paramount.  A more adaptive and responsive Alliance is bolstered by research, shared knowledge and diversity. Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Chris Whitecross, I am confident that the Alliance’s Premier Academic Institution will continue to transform education & training to meet the 21st century security challenges.” NATO Deputy Secretary General, Rose Gottemoeller receives a Military commemorative Coin as a token of appreciation from LtCol Nevena Miteva, Chair of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective. 3. QUESTION: In your role as NDC Commandant, you will be responsible for enhancing the College’s role as a centre of education, study and research on transatlantic issues. What are the major challenges you foresee in positioning the NDC as the Alliance’s primary academic institution amongst other key training hubs? The NATO Defense College is a unique institution. We have come to this conclusion by undertaking a benchmarking study on other national academic defence institutions, national defence universities and national defence colleges. It is unique, because it is entirely focused on the Alliance, its current concerns and future challenges. In addition to this, it brings together Allies and partners by providing them with a real-time platform to work together. We face several significant challenges: first, ensuring that we meet the needs of the Nations, and that they understand the comprehensive curriculum offered by the College. This helps ensure that Nations send their best and brightest senior leaders to our programmes. Second, our goal is to be timely and responsive to NATO and to our Nations. This also means preparing Nations’ senior leaders employed in future NATO roles by providing defence and security research they can use in their decision-making and their understanding of the security environment today. And finally, there are a number of areas in which we face challenges – a lot has to do with communication, and understanding where we can provide added value to NATO and our Nations. 4. QUESTION: For the second time in 2016, you have been named one of Canada’s top 100 most powerful women and you are the first woman to fill the role of NDC Commandant since the College was founded in 1951. How important is promoting diversity and integrating the gender perspective in education for defence and security? What value does it bring in your view? You can’t influence and make changes in the world if you only consider one part of the population. Women, men, different sexual orientations, from different cultures, visible minorities – they all bring value to decision-making and consensusbuilding. If you surround yourself with like-minded people, whether it is in gender or only bringing militaries to deal with an issue affecting a country, you are limiting your decision to one influenced by past decisions and by a homogenous group of people. If we want to influence the security environment of the future, we need to ensure we are introducing the knowledge, views and concerns of a variety of people. This means surrounding ourselves with diverse crowds, dissimilar cultures, religions, and ways of thinking. In doing so, we not only need to encourage 4

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Volume XV A Deep Insight people to come forward and express their views openly, but – more importantly – we have to make the effort to understand them. To do this, we have to build a respectful, open and inclusive environment. I suspect that this is what everybody is striving for here at NATO, and this is the underpinning principle of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. I strongly believe that this is fundamental to our success. 5. QUESTION: Projecting stability beyond NATO borders is essential to enhance the overall security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO partners represent an invaluable resource for the Alliance and the cornerstone of cooperative security. How is education benefiting from NATO partners (and vice versa), so that they can contribute to NATO’s strategic objectives? If you look at where NATO is today, and the wide array of partnerships the Alliance has built, we clearly notice that our areas of cooperation reach beyond NATO’s borders. We apply a comprehensive and collective approach by collaborating with others across the globe. By encouraging and inviting nonNATO Nations from all different groups and Organizations, we are instilling diversity and fresh ideas in our institution. Therefore, the NATO Defense College, as part of its curricula, looks at the world in its different working envirorments, promoting a wider understanding of their components and their different elements of power: the governance and political aspects, the military and defence aspects, the population, the culture and the society. Bringing in representatives from those areas into these discussions will encourage them to participate, to engage. Embracing their similarities and differences, you will have a deeply inclusive approach to decision-making. That’s what NATO partners bring to the table – they represent an enormous value for the Alliance in their insights, expertise and diversity. 6. QUESTION: Education promotes human interoperability, which is essential to ensure that Allies and partners, militaries and civilians can work together to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives in a multinational setting. How does education contribute to achieving a greater level of interoperability among Allies and partners, militaries and civilians? As Nations, we need to understand the complexity and the different dynamics of military and civilian leadership, by adopting a more holistic approach when bringing them together in a multinational environment such as NATO. We are all different. Insofar as we have shared purposes, and (as members of NATO) a shared understanding of where we want to go, we sometimes accommodate this in different ways. Civilian-military cooperation is a unique and differentiating factor. We need to better reinforce this understanding. Education provides access to do just this, as it reinforces human interoperability. It gives us the ability to understand concepts at a basic level, it gives us the opportunity to discuss them and to provide our own views and opinions. This is how we can contribute to a bigger purpose – keeping the Alliance together and keeping it successful. I think that education is a responsibility of all leaders, regardless of whether they are military or civilians. We need to reinforce this, so that we can continue to work as a cohesive Alliance. 7. QUESTION: Continuous adaptation of the Alliance is essential in responding to new security challenges in a complex and unpredictable environment. Why are the NDC’s outreach activities critical enablers to NATO’s adaptation? The College promotes a wide range of activities. It provides courses of different duration to Allies and partners, and to diverse audiences. The College has a Research Division, where Researchers provide in-depth understanding and insight that help with decision-making cycles and influence policy formation. They also increase understanding on pertinent issues, whether it’s cyber or counter-insurgency. The College is going through an academic curriculum review right now. We are currently looking at what knowledge base we have provided in the past continued overleaf... 5

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A Deep Insight Vox Collegii and how we can leverage this legacy to ensure it meets the security challenges of the 21st century. We need to identify new areas of focus in order to benefit the Alliance as a whole, and avoid the risk of being outpaced by evolving security challenges. 8. QUESTION: Developing a solid relationship with academia, research institutes and think tanks ensures that the NDC taps into a basin of critical knowledge and innovation fit to serve the purposes of the Alliance. How is NDC fostering this important relationship? The NATO Defense College has close relationships with major think tanks around the world, and certainly those that are working in defence and security. The unique advantage of having NATO researchers here at the College is that they provide timely and pertinent responses to students attending the courses. We also have created an outreach capability where researchers and students are part of a network of defence and security experts. This is a great opportunity for NATO StratCom efforts and provides more information and knowledge to people who do not understand the purpose or mission of the Alliance. The rapid turnover of military and civilian staff at the NATO Defense College is critical for bringing in fresh ideas, innovative ways of doing business and conducting research, and addressing the needs of the Alliance for the future. 9. QUESTION: What piece of advice would you deliver to future leaders, military and civilian, men and women, who want to make a difference and drive change in the security and defence domain? The first factor that I would like to highlight is that communication is key. It is fundamental to understand the issues at play and those niche capabilities that you are good at, in order to truly make a difference. You need a fundamental understanding of the area you are working in and a strong ability to communicate not just by written words or verbally, but by engaging key leadership and target audiences, and identifying networking opportunities where we can maintain a collaborative relationship. It’s also about embracing change, diversity, and what people have to offer, because we are all different and we all contribute with our strengths and weaknesses. These qualities make the Alliance greater than the sum of its parts – embrace and engage new people, and try to learn as much as you can from them, as you are moving forward. 10. QUESTION: Without future “strategic thinkers”, the Alliance cannot tap into the critical knowledge it needs to confront a challenging security environment. As part of your longterm vision for the Alliance’s primary academic institution, what are the prevalent areas in the NDC’s curriculum you would focus on during your mandate? During my mandate I will start developing areas on which I want the College to focus in the future. Within the Research Division, I believe we need to increase the team itself, and encourage people to apply for the vacant posts. This creates synergy because, once you have more researchers, you have a greater capacity to contribute and expand your network. As part of our curriculum review, we are already focusing on the areas that certainly represent a challenge for NATO – whether it is cyber issues or the biosphere. At the same time, we are striving to be innovative and provide new ideas to current issues. This creates the right space and mindset for students who come to the College, to have a better and more fundamental understanding of key security challenges the Alliance faces. It is essential, as they are moving forward, whether they are appointed to a NATO post or go back to their own Nations. Moreover, the opportunity to study, engage and contribute in the unique environment of the NATO Defense College results in a multiplier effect and a return on investment, for the Nations and for the Alliance. In addition to that, we need to communicate better what the College does and emphasize, to the Nations, the Alliance and our partners, the uniqueness of the NATO Defense College and what we can offer in terms of education for the Nations’ senior leaders. I am excited to see what opportunities we find and where they take us. 6

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Volume XV A Deep Insight NATO’s Future: A Political View Michael Rühle Michael Rühle, is currently Head, Energy Security Section, in the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO’s International Staff. PreviouslyhewasHead,Speechwriting, and Senior Political Advisor in the NATO Secretary General’s Policy Planning Unit. Before joining NATO's International Staff in 1991, Mr. Rühle was a Volkswagen Fellow at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, Germany, and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C. He holds an M.A. degree in Political Science from the University of Bonn. Mr. Rühle has published widely on international security issues in, among others, American Foreign Policy Interests, Comparative Strategy, European Security, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Russia in Global Affairs, International Affairs (Chatham House), International Herald Tribune, The Journal of Transatlantic Studies, NATO Review, Parameters, Strategic Review, and The World Today. He has also co-authored a book on missile defence. His essay “Good and Bad Nuclear Weapons” was published in March 2009 in both German and English. The opinions expressed in this article are his own and must not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Introduction: Shattered Assumptions Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, and growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa have fundamentally altered the strategic environment in which NATO finds itself. The three central assumptions which underpinned NATO’s agenda since the end of the Cold War are no longer valid. Neither did Russia's evolution remain benign, nor could the enlargement of the two major Western institutions, NATO and the European Union (EU), be reconciled with Russian interests. And the ambivalent results of the Afghanistan mission have also undermined the assumption that NATO was going to define itself increasingly by crisis management missions outside Europe. Against this backdrop, some observers have concluded that NATO should again concentrate on its core mission of collective defence. But a simple “back-to-basics” won’t do. Building a solid NATO deterrence and defence posture in Central and Eastern Europe is paramount, but Russia is not the Soviet Union and Putin is not Stalin. Above all, globalization has not been suspended by the Ukraine crisis. Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than the current debate over how to deal with “Islamic State/Daesh”, the conflict in Syria, and the wave of refugees from the Middle East and Northern Africa that is hitting Europe. Clearly, threats to European security do not just come from the East, but also from the South. President Trump’s warning that Allies should not only spend more, but also step up their engagement alongside the US in military missions and operations, is only the most recent reminder that NATO cannot simply “come home”. Rather, NATO needs to find a new balance between collective defence and crisis management, and it needs to adjust its entire political-military toolbox to a fast-changing security environment. As NATO is embarking on this journey, six specific challenges stand out. Collective Defence First and foremost, NATO must offer its geographically exposed Allies in Central and Eastern Europe credible military protection. While it appears unlikely that Russia harbours territorial ambitions beyond those countries it has already earmarked as being within its “zone of privileged interests”, Moscow’s obsession with demonstrating both military strength and political resolve could lead to all kinds of unwelcome behaviour vis-à-vis the West, including against NATO members. Consequently, NATO is increasing its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. While the rotational presence in NATO’s East remains modest in order to stay within the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, the challenges of implementing this renewed focus on collective defence are formidable. For example, keeping forces on high readiness is something only the larger nations can do, and only at considerable cost. The logistical challenges are also significant. The days when continued overleaf... 7

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A Deep Insight Vox Collegii NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets the Prime Minister of Montenegro, Duško Marković. NATO was regularly exercising large-scale reinforcements – during the Cold War, the United States used to bring an entire corps across the Atlantic – are long gone. Short warning times would also require NATO’s “frontline states” to invest in capacities that would enable them to hold out long enough for reinforcements to arrive. And NATO’s command structure, which has been considerably reduced in size, might also have to be adjusted to handle the new collective defence emphasis. In short, to meet the new collective defence requirements, NATO will have to relearn certain skills that over the past 20 years had not been in demand. Above all, Allies will have to bear additional costs – which will require them to make good on their 2014 Wales Summit pledge to increase defence expenditures over time. Nuclear deterrence must be part and parcel of this renewed focus on collective defence. This comprises not just an unambiguous (and unapologetic) political and rhetorical stance on the need for nuclear deterrence, but also a coherent deterrence narrative that sends an effective deterrence message to adversaries without unsettling NATO’s own populations. Moreover, NATO will also need to analyse Russian policy, strategy and doctrine in far greater detail. If NATO wants to relearn deterrence, Allies should know exactly who it is they want to deter – and how. Crisis Management and Beyond NATO’s re-emphasis of collective defence must not be at the expense of its expeditionary capabilities. This is not only because NATO needs to avoid a division into two regional groupings – one “East”, one “South” – with diverging security concerns. It is also because most future challenges to Allied security are likely to arise from developments outside Europe. NATO’s struggle about the right approach to its South is a case in point. In sharp contrast to NATO’s East, where the challenge is limited to one single state-actor with an unpredictable, yet rational leadership, the situation in the South is fundamentally different: the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) are beset with political disagreements, terrorism, sectarian violence, state failure, weak economies, and grim economic prospects. Hence, a passive deterrence approach along the lines of NATO’s East will be ineffective. In order to signal to NATO’s Southern Allies that they, too, can rely on NATO as an effective security framework, the Allies must craft a strategy of engagement that focuses on projecting stability in the region. In concrete terms, this means confronting ISIL/Daesh militarily, supporting certain anti-ISIL groups with training and equipment, engaging in Defence Capacity Building for certain countries in the region, as well as engaging in de-mining and similar supporting activities. One should not harbour any illusions about the limits of NATO’s role, however: Since stabilizing the MENA region is a generational effort that requires much more than military means, NATO will be only one of several players. All this means that, irrespective of the ongoing re-emphasis on collective defence, NATO must also continue to maintain its capabilities for crisis management beyond Europe. Militarily, this means that it must remain capable of performing expeditionary missions, with matching capabilities ranging from reconnaissance to air refuelling, to precision-guided weaponry. By contrast, “bringing NATO home” would be a regression. It would not only deprive European Allies of the ability to tackle the most likely kinds of challenges, but also decouple Europe from the US security agenda. As a result, transatlantic solidarity would wane and Europe would become even less relevant in the US security calculus. Non-traditional Challenges Events over the past years have shown that the safety and security of NATO’s over 900 million citizens can be affected as much by non-military threats as by traditional military ones. Cyberattacks are a case in point, having prompted NATO to step up its cyber defences, defining cyber as a distinct domain, and even alluding to cyberattacks as a possible trigger of an Article 5 response. Another challenge that NATO needs to address is that of “hybrid threats”. To destabilize Ukraine, Russia combined military, paramilitary, cyber-, economic, energy, and strategic communications tools. While this form of hybrid warfare may succeed only against states that are internally fragile and divided, it could inject enough ambiguity to make 8

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Volume XV A Deep Insight NATO’s strategic assessment and decision making difficult, while, at the same time, marginalizing elements of the full spectrum of NATO’s defensive capabilities. Cooperation with other institutions, notably the EU, will be a crucial element of any response. But NATO will also have to intensify its intelligence sharing and enhance its strategic analysis to create the situational awareness it needs to take informed decisions in ambiguous situations. In the same vein, NATO must become a forum in which new threats and potential responses can be discussed without artificial constraints. Allies need to shed the idea of being essentially a fire-brigade that only springs into action once the house is on fire. They need to look at longer-term trends and their security implications, be these political, economic or demographic. For example, they will need to look at how energy and resource considerations shape the security environment, and how climate change alters the environment in which NATO forces will have to operate. They also need to take a more systematic look at maritime security, at the security implications of the rise of Asia and of an endangered nuclear non-proliferation regime. The hesitation of Allies to discuss certain security developments, (e.g. the security implications of a nuclear Iran) out of concern that some of these debates might be controversial, diminishes NATO’s importance, notably in the eyes of the United States, and creates a risk of the Alliance losing touch with the globalization age. NATO’s role in, for example, addressing proliferation concerns or energy vulnerabilities may ultimately turn out to be modest. However, an Alliance that turns a blind eye to these challenges risks being surprised – and, eventually, divided – by them. Old and New Partnerships NATO also needs to rethink its approach to partnerships. Since the end of the Cold War NATO has built an unparalleled network that includes countries from several continents. Partnerships remain an opportunity for achieving several major goals: partners enhance the political legitimacy and military effectiveness of NATO-led operations, and, over time, also enlarge the pool of interoperable forces NATO can draw from. Moreover, acting with partners, notably those from the AsiaPacific region, also forces otherwise reluctant Allies to deal with partners’ security concerns. That way, NATO Allies collectively acquire the “global” mindset that will be essential for its future as a viable security organization. As the reduced military presence in Afghanistan can no longer provide the “common project” that brought Allies and many partners together, it is all the more important to cultivate other means of cooperation – whether through interoperability projects or exercises. NATO needs to send a clear signal that even as it re-emphasises collective defence it continues to value its partners, and that it considers maintaining good political relations and military interoperability with other countries as an indispensable investment in the globalization age. Flag-raising ceremony marking the accession of Montenegro to NATO Increasingly, the notion of partnership will have to be broadened and encompass closer relations with other institutions as well as the private sector and the scientific community. Just as defending against hybrid warfare requires NATO-EU cooperation, effective cyber defence or energy security will be impossible without NATO developing ties to the private companies, which own most of the networks. Similarly, continued overleaf... 9

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A Deep Insight Vox Collegii U.S. Military during a strategic Cyber Defense Exercise. in order to fathom the multiple security implications of climate change, particularly in the regions that might be hit hardest by rising global temperatures, NATO will need to reach out to those who scientifically analyse these developments. In sum, in line with the logic that “it takes a network to defeat a network”, NATO’s effectiveness will increasingly depend on how well it is connected with other players. NATO Enlargement The success of NATO’s enlargement policy, which increased the number of Allies from 16 at the end of the Cold War to now 29, is undisputed. NATO enlargement – complemented by the enlargement of the EU – changed the security dynamics in Europe for the better. It provided a security home for the new democracies emerging from behind the Iron Curtain, and it foreclosed the return to a policy of shifting alliances and unreliable security assurances that were characteristic of the interwar period. NATO enlargement was also a powerful tool for domestic reform in aspirant countries, often far beyond the defence and security sectors. Since the enlargement process was embedded in a broader cooperative effort – including a special relationship with Russia –, and since it did not entail major military deployments in the new member states, the process was clearly aimed at enlarging a democratic security community rather than at “encircling” Russia. Put differently: the method was the message. Russia never approved of NATO’s enlargement, yet neither did it actively oppose it. This has now changed. Russia appears to perceive even Ukraine’s mere EU association as an assault on its interests and used force to undermine it. Hence, in the post-2014 security environment NATO can offer membership only to countries it can credibly defend. With Russia willing to use force in order to prevent NATO’s further “encroachment” into its declared sphere of interest, NATO’s Eastern enlargement is becoming a delicate balancing act between defending fundamental principles (such as the free choice of alignment) and realpolitik considerations. Allies have to ponder how to safeguard the right of each country to choose its future security orientation in a non-cooperative environment, and how to signal to aspiring members that the door of the Alliance remains open. For example, can one discuss alternatives to NATO membership without relegating certain neighbours of Russia to a zone of limited sovereignty, or would Moscow understand this as a vindication of its bullying tactics − and as the West granting Russia a "droit de regard” over its neighbours? As pointed out below, the solution to these dilemmas can only lie in a conversation between the West and Russia that reaches far beyond NATO. NATO-Russia Relations Events of the past years have demonstrated once again that Russia remains Europe’s greatest security variable, as that country determines the shape of European security far more than any other does. NATO should not accept Russia’s confrontational stance as the “new normal”, but neither should it lose sight of the bigger picture: the future order of Europe and Russia’s place within it. This unresolved issue lies at the heart of the current crisis, irrespective of the fact that many aspects of Russia’s current behaviour have their roots in domestic policy. The post-Cold War order rests on the enlargement of Western institutions as well as on Western-inspired norms, including the right of each state to choose its security alignments. These New NATO Headquarters Handover Ceremony in Brussels 10

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Volume XV A Deep Insight principles are non-negotiable, yet their full implementation could well lead to Russia’s geopolitical marginalization. Assuming that the attractiveness of the Western model will always exceed that of Russia, Moscow must fear that most of its neighbourhood will wrest itself from its embrace and orient itself westward. Russia has therefore concluded that she must resist these tendencies by creating facts on the ground that prevent her neighbours from moving closer to the West. Resolving this conundrum requires a much more fundamental conversation than those taking place in the NATO-Russia Council. The NATO-Russia relationship is simply too narrow a framework for dealing with the “big picture” issues. They must be broached at a higher level, where Russia and the West can seek agreement or “quid pro quos” over a wider range of issues. NATO would only provide the atmospheric accompaniment to such a dialogue. Yet this makes it even more important that NATO appear open-minded and cooperative. Moreover, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia can veto NATO-led crisis management operations: another reason for NATO and Russia to seek a pragmatic relationship. Conclusion Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and instability across Northern Africa and the Middle East are healthy reminders of the continuing importance of a transatlantic security alliance. To continue to be effective, however, NATO must resist the temptation of reverting to its Cold War eurocentrism. Although Russia’s behaviour (rather than extra-European threats) has compelled many Allies to increase their defence budgets, NATO must remain an outward-looking Alliance, capable of engaging in a wide range of missions and operations, and better connected to other major players. Only such an outward- looking NATO can be an effective security provider in the globalization age. 11

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A Deep Insight Vox Collegii NATO and the WPS agenda: on the road towards “mission achieved” Daisy Bisoffi Daisy Bisoffi, currently working as an Intern at the SR WPS Office, holds a Bachelor’s degree in International and Diplomatic Studies, and a Master’s degree in Political Strategy and Communication with International Conflict and Security. Within the Office of the Secretary General, the Office of the Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security works to reduce barriers for women’s participation in NATO’s, Allies’ and partners’ defence and security institutions, and within NATO-led operations, missions, and crisis management; and to ensure gender perspectives are integrated in policies, activities and efforts undertaken by NATO, Allies and partners to prevent and resolve conflicts. It ensures coordination and consistency in NATO’s efforts to implement UNSCR1325 throughout its three core tasks and to strengthen the Alliance’s outreach and cooperation with other partner countries, international organizations and civil society on the WPS agenda. The views expressed are the responsibility of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “NATO has a story to tell in this respect. A story that is at the same time hands-on, ambitious and daring (…). The NATO story is a story of guts, of daring to be principled.”1 "1325” is the codename for a slow but unstoppable revolution2. This is how Amb. Marriët Schuurman, former NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, defined what has been unanimously praised as a milestone Resolution: United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. Celebrated as “the single greatest achievement in ‘engendering’ global security policy”3, UNSCR 1325 has been commended since its adoption on 31 October 2000 for having finally granted women access to the international peace and security field, dismantling the longstanding formal barrier between traditionally soft sociopolitical issues and hard security. It addresses the disproportionate impact that armed conflict has on women, and recognizes their undervalued contributions to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, therefore encouraging increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions, as well as consultation with women's groups. In recognizing that there can be no sustainable peace without equal inclusion of women and men alike, UNSCR 1325 became the landmark “No Women, No 1) Farewell address to the North Atlantic Council by the NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for WPS, Marriët Schuurman; http://www.nato.int/cps/bu/natohq/opinions_142738.htm?selectedLocale=en 2) Speech by Amb. Marriët Schuurman at the University of Maryland University College commencement ceremony, April 30, 2016 (Kaiserslautern, Germany); http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_130521.htm?selectedLocale=en 3) Klot, J. (2015), “The United Nations security council’s agenda on ‘women, peace and security’: Bureaucratic pathologies and unrealised potential”; http:// etheses.lse.ac.uk/3101/ 12

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Volume XV A Deep Insight Empowering women: an Afghan officer trains with an Australian mentor in Kabul. Peace” resolution, followed by seven related resolutions4: UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009), UNSCR 1889 (2009), UNSCR 1960 (2010), UNSCR 2106 (2013), UNSCR 2122 (2013) and UNSCR 2242 (2015). Taken together, these set the international framework for the implementation of a gender perspective in the pursuit of international security and the conduct of peace operations5; and for empowering women to take their rightful, active, and meaningful role in preventing and resolving conflicts, in restoring peace and security, and in building resilient and prosperous societies6. These resolutions are referred to collectively in NATO as the ‘Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda’. And when it comes to the Alliance’s commitment to the WPS agenda, with a view to better and lasting peace and security (i.e., ‘inclusive security’), NATO indeed has a story to tell. Hands-on Looking at the Alliance’s engagement with WPS principles, the progress made in laying the foundations stands out clearly: NATO has come a long way in establishing the normative framework; in setting standards and institutionalizing WPS priorities in its core structures. The key to NATO’s success in 4) Schuurman, M. (2015), “NATO and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Time to Bring It Home”, CONNECTIONS Quarterly Journal, Volume XIV, Number 3, Summer 2015, pp. 1-6; https:// www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/ docs/PfP-Quarterly%20Journal%2014.3%20Summer%202015.pdf 5) Egnell, R., Hojem, P., Berts H. (2012), “Implementing a Gender Perspective in Military Organisations and Operations: The Swedish Armed Forces Model”, Report / Department of Peace and Conflict Research 98, Uppsala University, p. 1; http://jamda.ub.gu.se/bitstream/1/733/1/egnell.pdf 6) Schuurman, M. (2015), op. cit. implementing UNSC R1325 lies in its line of action: ‘keep it practical’. Every effort is made to translate the principle of gender equality into practical tools, targets and actions7. NATO began to focus on the WPS agenda in earnest in 2007 (although the Alliance’s attention to gender equality can be traced back to the early 1960s8), with the agreement of a policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The first Action Plan was endorsed at the NATO Summit in Lisbon in 2010, followed in 2012 by a groundbreaking declaration at the Chicago Summit, and the appointment of a Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security (SGSR WPS)9 by the NATO Secretary General. The position was made permanent two years later – a milestone in the Alliance’s commitment to the WPS mission10 – at the Wales Summit, when a revised policy and action plan were also agreed by Allies. On the military side, in 2009 NATO’s two Strategic Commands – Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) – issued a Directive (BI-SC Dir 40-1 REV 1) providing guidance to all levels in the military structure on the integration of a gender perspective. Revised in 2012, this has been superseded by the latest version approved in May 2017. In 2015, Military Guidelines on the prevention and response to conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence (CR-SGBV) were approved and are now being implemented by NATO’s Strategic Commands, always within the WPS comprehensive approach and holistic framework. At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, the latest revision11 of the NATO/EAPC Action Plan in support of the NATO/EAPC Policy on the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda was endorsed by 55 nations (now constituting the largest UNSCR 1325 coalition worldwide) – all the Allies, the EAPC partners and six global partners. Delegating responsibility for implementation to different divisions of NATO and National and Military authorities12, the Plan has two strategic, overarching 7) Ibid. 8) For an overview, see: NATO, “40th anniversary of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives”, 31 May. 2016; http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/news_131710.htm?selectedLocale=en. 9) As from October 2016, the SGSR WPS mandate also includes the responsibility for tasks related to the Protection of Civilians (POC) section in Operations Division. The SGSR WPS position is currently vacant, and expected to be filled by Autumn 2017. 10) Cf. Wright, K.A. (2016) “NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security: Making the agenda a reality”, International Political Science Review, 37(3), pp. 350–361. doi: 10.1177/0192512116638763. 11) The next revision is due in 2018. 12) Nations are encouraged to improve the gender balance in the military and civilian staff deployed in peace operations; to ensure all personnel deployed has received basic gender training before deployment; and to assign and deploy well trained gender experts to NATO-led operations. Also, to have adequate codes of conduct in place and to follow up on complaints related to sexual harassment and misconduct. continued overleaf... 13

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