Vox Collegii Vol XIII


Embed or link this publication


NDC Magazine Vox Collegii Volume XIII , Volume 13 July 16

Popular Pages

p. 1


p. 2


p. 3

Editorial CONTENTS The Commandant’s Corner A Deep Insight: The clash of civilizations? Russia vs. the West, or Conservative vs. Liberal political paradigms by Sanja Ivic Resilient for how long? Information technology warfare in the 21st century: The Alliance's invisible threat by Nadia El Fertasi and Diana De Vivo Charting a course to NATO membership: Understanding Montenegro's maritime strategy by Brooke Smith-Windsor Life at the College: 50 years in Rome - 65 years serving NATO Highlights: Our Courses Our Guests Our Publications 2 3 4 8 16 20 21 25 29 Editor-in-Chief: LtCol Alberto Alletto (ITA A) Editor: Federica Metus (ITA C) Assistant Editors: Ali Eren Guven (TUR C) Giulia Ferrandu (ITA C) Francisco J. Marin-Barrena (ESP C) Proof-reading: Caroline Curta (FRA C) Peter G. Mead (GBR C) Photography: NATO - NDC Reproductions Section Graphic Design & Printing: Grafich Communication S.r.l. (Fondi -LT-)


p. 4

Editorial Vox Collegii This year marks a signi cant milestone for the NATO Defense College: 2016 is a year of celebration commemorating the 50th anniversary of the NDC’s relocation to Rome and the 65th since its foundation. This year will also mark the end of my tenure here at the NDC: being part of this family has not only been an honour but also a real privilege and, in spite of the many challenges, I will always treasure the time spent and the experience gained at the NATO Defense College. So, in view of my reassignment, this editorial will be my last. After four years at the NDC I can truly say that this has been an “amazing adventure” which has helped me to grow professionally, thanks also to my team of highly competent colleagues. The celebrations planned for the anniversary of the College have already begun with the visit of the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda. The visit, on 17th May, marked the rst step towards a series of important events that will take place inOctober,whenthe College hosts the NATO Secretary General and Heads of State. The NDC’s presence in Rome has always been of paramount importance to Italy; as the Alliance’s prime educational institution, the NATO Defense College plays a key role in preparing high-level military o cers and civilians to take up future positions of authority to safeguard the freedom and security of member states, and to achieve this the College continuously readjusts its curricula in keeping with current global developments. In spite of the sixty- ve years that have passed since November 1951, the NDC continues to innovate and to adjust to the times. This is the reason for which we chose to entitle the anniversary event “Listening for the wind of change, preparing the future”. The College has always been granted a special responsibility by NATO: it is a faithful interpreter of the Alliance’s resolve, contributing to the cohesion between member states and encouraging dialogue with others. Moving on to the magazine, the articles in this issue cover a number of interesting topics. One of them deals with relations between Russia and Western countries, exploring major divergences between the Russian political heritage and the prevailing liberal paradigm in the West. According to the article, the only solution to the con ict between Russia and the West is a “fusion of horizons” – in other words, cross-cultural dialogue is necessary in order to achieve a successful and peaceful relationship. Another interesting topic covered in this edition of Vox Collegii is Montenegro’s maritime strategy. After starting accession negotiations in 2010, NATO’s formal invitation to the tiny mountainous state was issued in 2015, while the Accession Protocol for Montenegro was signed by Foreign Ministers on 19th May this year, thus paving the way towards full membership. As NATO member states are both security consumers and security providers, Montenegro has been requested to de ne its maritime strategy. The third article discusses information technology warfare in the 21st century. This article sheds light on the importance of IT for NATO, for the monitoring and gathering of information, enabling the Organization to remain resilient in a continuously changing security landscape. Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Alletto Italian Army, Head Public A airs O ce 2


p. 5

Volume XIII The Commandant’s Corner This year the NATO Defense College will be celebrating a major event in its history. Next October, the annual Anciens’ Conference and Seminar will coincide with celebrations to mark the sixty- fth anniversary of the NDC’s foundation and the ftieth anniversary of its relocation from Paris to Rome. Celebrations started early, with a visit by the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda on 17th May. As host nation, Italy has always been a great supporter of our work and the College’s excellent facilities bear testimony to Italy’s enduring e orts. The College continues to ful l its outreach mission with vision and energy, through a dynamic programme of initiatives and events. Our goal remains the same as 65 years ago: to build relationships and strengthen partnerships between allied nations. NATO’s Strategic Concept identi es “cooperative security” as one of NATO’s three essential core tasks, alongside crisis management and collective defence. It states that the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partnerships with countries and organizations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s ‘360°’ approach in addressing threats to international peace and security. An important topic, which I have supported keenly throughout my mandate as Commandant, is the accreditation of the NDC Senior Course with a view to a subsequent Master’s degree. The Military Committee commissioned a review of the NDC which reported back in 2014, suggesting ways of enhancing the experience of the Senior Course. One of the recommendations was to facilitate study towards a Master’s degree and o er this opportunity to Course Members, without adversely impacting our current curriculum or their commitment to the Senior Course. An internal study recognized that full accreditation of the NDC was not appropriate on the basis of cost, curriculum interference and impact on the consensual ethos of the College. However, a proposal has been found to facilitate ambitious Course Members who wanttostudyforaMaster’s,whichisanexciting prospect. We have been working with a number of universities and Leicester University in the UK has provided an opening to start the process, which we are hoping to have ready in time for Senior Course 129 in September of this year. This should enable a Course Member to enroll on one of seven Master’s degree courses, coinciding with the start of the Senior Course in September and March. The Master’s degree will be a exible programme that could be completed over a period of two to four years. Successful completion of the Senior Course will be considered equivalent to a UK Master’s module in ‘Strategy in the Modern World’. Another priority I have set during my time at the NDC has been to hold one major event each year. In 2015, we hosted a conference on “NATO and the New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats”; on 17th May this year, as mentioned above, we welcomed the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda. The NATO Defense College intends to organize other such events in the future, so stay tuned to nd out what will be on the schedule for next year. Major General Janusz Bojarski Polish Air Force, NDC Commandant 3


p. 6

A Deep Insight Vox Collegii The clash of civilizations? Russia vs. the West, or conservative vs. liberal political paradigms Sanja Ivic Sanja Ivic is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic, and a Research Fellow at the Institute for European Studies, Serbia. She completed her Postdoctoral research at the University of Paris 10, France. She is a member of Editorial Boards of three peer-reviewed international journals: International Law Research (Canada); American International Journal of Contemporary Research (USA); and Journal of Law and Con ict Resolution (Africa). She also cooperates with various international scienti c institutes and teams. She was a member of the Steering Group of the project “Pluralism, Inclusion, Citizenship” (UK) and she is currently a Board Member of the International Society for Philosophers. Her publications include books and articles on various subjects in the elds of international relations, philosophy and European studies. Her book European Identity and Citizenship: Between Modernity and Postmodernity was published by Palgrave Macmillan, UK in 2016. Comprehending the wider context of Russia’s foreign policy and its cultural, religious and philosophical background is signi cant, as it enables political dialogue and prevents the establishment of false, potentially dangerous approaches and contexts in which American and European leaders make their decisions. The realm of international relations is dynamic, not static, and should not be based on xed identities and assumptions. Russia is not the Soviet Union and it is necessary to perceive it from the postsocialist perspective in order to understand Russian geopolitical strategy and comprehend what lies behind Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its confrontational policies towards Ukraine. The Ukraine crisis was a predictable consequence of Western policies in Russia’s neighbourhood and consistent with the essentially conservative Russian political and philosophical heritage, not just the result of imperialistically motivated opportunism. In light of this political, cultural and philosophical background, Russia’s foreign policy becomes easier to predict and continuity may be identi ed. Russian and Western paradigms re ect two di erent worlds, based on the di erences between a conservative and a liberal political heritage, consistent with Samuel Huntington’s idea of a “clash of civilizations”. According to Huntington (1993: 22): “The fundamental source of con ict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of con ict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world a airs, but the principal con icts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of di erent civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” The realm of politics is also a realm of interpretation and that is why the consequences of incommensurable, con icting paradigms can be dangerous, leading to various types of political crisis. The Russia-West crisis is based on two di erent visions of post-Soviet Russia. According to the Western perspective, Russia should adopt a liberal political paradigm and Western political values. NATO's identity as a global actor is built on liberal values, which include democracy, rule of law, individual liberty and human rights. However, the Russian perspective rejects Western-centric paradigms and the idea of moral and political universalism, while it gives priority to a conservative heritage, the concept of Westphalian sovereignty and Orthodox Christian values. 4


p. 7

Volume XIII A Deep Insight Russia’s perception of the West is shaped by metanarratives, as is the Western perception of Russia. Metanarratives (or grand narratives) describe political, social, historical or cultural output based on a coherent, monolithic, one-dimensional perspective, which becomes a dominant, widely accepted point of view in public discourse, “political correct” versions of history or certain political and social actions. Postmodernist authors question all grand narratives and show how they are used to justify various power structures. Russia’s anti-Western grand narrative is based on the following assumptions: NATO's enlargement eastward as a strategy to weaken Russia; American paternalism; rejection of Western-centric paradigms and values, as well as the liberal hegemonic order; Russia as the guardian of sovereignty and traditional values, and so forth. On the other hand, Western metanarratives on Russia include the following assumptions: the need for Russia to embrace Western values and a liberal paradigm; Putin’s imperialism and anti-Western politics; Russia's illiberal domestic and aggressive foreign politics, aiming to bring Russia back to the power and in uence that the Soviet Union had during the Cold War. Both Russian antiWesternism and Western Russophobia are one-sided and based on approaches which exclude and demonize the “Other”. In order to enable a political dialogue, it is necessary to revisit the discourses and grand narratives which provide a rationale for the claimed incompatibility between Russia and the West. Contemporary Russia's foreign policy should be comprehended in light of the conservative heritage and philosophical and political perspectives of Nikolai Berdyaev, Vladimir Solovyov and Ivan Ilyin. Those three thinkers are as important for understanding contemporary Russia as Thomas Paine, Thomas Je erson and Benjamin Franklin are for understanding American principles of politics and democracy. Knowledge of Russia’s conservative intellectual heritage is necessary to https://www.flickr.com/photos/nato/8674568993/in/photolist-edxr9n-edD6Jj-edD6G5-edxr9v-edwrEc-edwrtX-edC6PQ-edwrkc-9Zp2jT-kWaqr5-9Zs3Jb-jWMrhu-edwrze-edC6Jw-edC6MJ-edC6WSedwrst-edwrAV-edwrfK-edC76d-edwrsc-edwrCK-edC6Sh-edC6PS-edwrqK-edwrqn-edwrHe-edC6KY-edwrvT-qNv18N-aSHYjP-kWaqU9-kW8SKx-kW9vuc-kWarS1-kWarDA-kW8S1r-kW8QWc- kWaraj-kW9vGg-kW9tZP-kW9tL2-kW9t4kPress conference by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Press conference by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov continued ... 5


p. 8

A Deep Insight Vox Collegii https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Armed_Forces#/media/File:Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_2013-05-09_(41d462db420812a9c260).jpg Vladimir Putin and Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu, Victory Day Parade in Moscow, 9 May 2013. place contemporary Russian government in an appropriate intellectual and political perspective, perceive consistency in Russia's foreign politics, and predict its future actions. The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, is a representative of the Russian tradition of “liberal-conservativism”, which stems from native Russian schools of thought, di erent from the ideals represented by the Western Enlightenment. According to Berdyaev (1915a), Russian national self-consciousness was born “within the disputes of Slavophilism and Westernism”, which represent two fundamentally di erent perspectives. Berdyaev, Solovyov and Ilyin advocate Russia's special and unique purpose and place in the world, Orthodox Christian values, and autocracy. However, the sense given to the concept of autocracy by these Russian thinkers is di erent from the more general understanding of this term. It should be perceived as a religious and philosophical concept – “a manifestation of non-state spirit” (Berdyaev 1915b). The writings of these philosophers contain liberal elements, although they do not perceive Western democracy as a desirable political model. Based on this conservative heritage, Russia's interpretation of international law di ers from Western approaches. As stated by Mälksoo (2015: 141): “The balance point between the principles of state sovereignty and human rights has altogether been found to be in a di erent place in Russia and the West. Western scholars usually emphasize human rights and the individual in the context of international law while in terms of the hierarchy of principles Russians continue to give priority to the principle of state sovereignty. On the level of predominant ideas in scholarship, many international law scholars in EU countries have become adherents of the political philosophy that emphasizes human rights and makes a distinction between liberal and illiberal states whereas Russia has intellectually remained a sovereigns stronghold, a conservative and illiberal force in international law.” 6


p. 9

Volume XIII A Deep Insight This clash of interpretations is, actually, an echo of an old philosophical question: Is it possible to reach consensus on human rights and perception of international law? Political philosopher John Rawls's (1985) idea of reasonable pluralism points to a di erent understanding of the concept of “public political culture”, albeit based on common principles and ideas that may be di erently interpreted and justi ed from the points of view of di erent cultures and policies. Warnke (1993: 42) sums this argument up as follows: “Indeed, even if we possess ‘a shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles’, we may nonetheless give di erent degrees of emphasis to di erent aspects of this fund, understand the relation between these aspects in di erent ways, stress di erent dimensions internal to them or understand the fund itself within di erent contexts of interpretation. Where these circumstances hold we may come to understand the meaning of the fund di erently as well.” Rawls (1971) coined the term “overlapping consensus”, which refers to the possibility of representatives of di erent social groups/policies achieving agreement on basic norms/principles of justice, although they would not agree on the interpretation of these norms, which they would construe in accordance with their comprehensive doctrines (metaphysical, religious, philosophical, political and other paradigms). John Rawls, Charles Taylor and many other liberal thinkers argue that a distinction should be made between human rights norms on the one hand, and their interpretation and justi cation on the other hand. The main discrepancies in human rights, as perceived from the perspectives of di erent cultures, are not based on legal norms, but on di erent interpretations of those norms (Taylor 1994). Taylor (op. cit.: 67) argues that in order to reconcile those di erences, discourse of human rights in Western and other cultures should be examined in order to achieve a consensus regarding some aspects of rights, which would lead to a “fusion of horizons”: “Because, for a su ciently di erent culture, the very understanding of what it is to be of worth will be strange and unfamiliar to us [...]. What has to happen is what Gadamer has called a ‘fusion of horizons’. We learn to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formerly taken for granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility alongside the di erent background of the formerly unfamiliar culture. The ‘fusion of horizons’ operates through our developing new vocabularies of comparison, by means of which we can articulate these contrasts.” In order to resolve the current con ict between the West and Russia (which is, actually, based on two di erent metanarratives, liberal and conservative), it is precisely a fusion of horizons that is needed. The concept, originally coined by Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975), stems from the premise that individuals always come from di erent cultural, historical, educational, linguistic, religious and philosophical backgrounds which in uence their way of thinking, this being culturally, historically and philosophically embedded. The fusion of horizons is a dialectical concept which may be de ned as a cross-cultural dialogue that transforms human understanding (Gadamer 1975). This cross-cultural dialogue, one of the fundamental tasks of international policy, is necessary in order to achieve successful political dialogue and cooperation between Russia and the West (as representatives of two di erent political paradigms and perceptions of global order). However, any society which is preoccupied with the protection of one particular grand narrative will not be open to transformation based on such a dialogue. 7


p. 10

A Deep Insight Vox Collegii Resilient for how long? Information Technology Warfare in the 21st century: The Alliance’s invisible threat Nadja El Fertasi Diana De Vivo 1. Introduction Nadja El Fertasi holds the position of Stakeholder Engagement Senior Executive Coordinator in the NATO Communications & Information Agency. She is responsible for developing and maintaining close engagement with key stakeholders, and ensuring the General Manager’s position on key issues is accurately presented and stakeholders’ positions clearly understood. Nadja holds a Master's degree in International Relations from the University of Cambridge and is an Alumna of the NATO-wide Executive Development Programme. She has a keen interest in international relations, security studies and politics. She is uent in Dutch, English, French and Arabic, and is pro cient in Italian and German. Diana De Vivo is currently working in the Executive Management team of the NATO Communications & Information Agency, and is responsible for supporting the General Manager and the Chief of Sta with internal governance and decision-making. Diana holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and Politics and has worked at the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Italian delegation to NATO, and JFC Naples. She is uent in Italian, English and French, and also pro cient in Spanish. Today NATO faces the rise of new technologies, national powers, and nonstate actors: sophisticated, asymmetric and unconventional threats to the Alliance’s security. NATO’s Information Technology (IT) transformation in the 21st century is paramount; protecting NATO’s nervous system is critical, and failure is not an option. To ensure that NATO’s IT in all its facets (cyber, network and pointto-point) continues to be resilient against 21st century information warfare threats, nations should do more to back up their political claims with tangible nancial commitments. Imagine that a long-range ballistic missile is launched and targeting NATO’s population, territory or forces. NATO Commanders may only have six minutes to make the strategic decision to engage and intercept the incoming missile. Their reliance on the operational information provided through IT networks is total, ensuring the right information, at the right time, in the right place. The loss of a Common Operating Picture (COP) would likely be a conduit for disaster. NATO’s IT networks constitute an integral part of the Alliance’s resilience. Sounds dramatic? Well let’s bring it closer to everyday reality. NATO has always maintained a technical advantage over its potential adversaries. Through its Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS), consisting of ve Global Hawk Unmanned Vehicle (UAVs) and Ground Control Stations, the Alliance will have a 21st century system that will support the 8


p. 11

Volume XIII A Deep Insight U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Roland Hale, 1st Inf. Div. Public Affairs fc. Brian Juno, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, uses computer software at Fort Riley's Battle Command Training Center Commander’s comprehensive real-time and near real-time situational awareness at strategic distance and within hours, if not minutes, of a crisis arising. AGS will gather massive amounts of data to enable situational awareness of land and maritime environments; but what use are a Global Hawk and its ground stations, without the IT infrastructure through which its data is communicated for possible use by decision-makers? NATO’s IT enables surveillance and intelligence gathering, serving as NATO’s eyes in the sky in light of increased airspace security breaches on its borders. Ensuring continuous situational awareness in speci c areas of interest, during critical periods of heightened tension, is therefore of the utmost importance. Without the current IT architecture to support operational capability, both the Alliance and nations risk making uninformed decisions with incomplete and fragmentary data, with results that could lead to potentially serious unintended consequences. Decision-makers must acknowledge that the resilience of NATO’s IT infrastructure allows the Alliance to bring to bear those military capabilities, like AGS, which give it a strategic technical advantage over potential adversaries. NATO knows from experience that a nation can be targeted and su er major disruptions to its infrastructure at the click of a mouse. A three-week sequence of massive cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 is just one example of the alarming, unprecedented scale of cyber warfare. It is appreciating that Cyber resilience is not static and has invested in every sense to ensure it is increasingly cyber-resilient to counter a major cyberattack that might impact the conduct of an essential NATO operation or related decision. What many do not yet appreciate is that cyber defence is more than countering electronic attacks: a network approach to resilience is required. An enterprise that includes NATO, its nations, perhaps some partners, industry and an acceptance that what has been done in the past to maintain the Alliance’s IT infrastructure and defences is not what will work in the future. This article highlights the importance of IT as NATO’s nervous continued ... 9


p. 12

A Deep Insight Vox Collegii US Army photo by D. Myles Cullen Army Staff Sgt. Jenkins briefs Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George W. Casey, Jr., about technologies being incorporated into the current war against terrorism. system, allowing the Alliance to remain resilient as network warfare becomes increasingly prevalent in the continuously evolving volatile security landscape. It argues that, in order to ensure NATO maintains its edge in military technology and keeps up with the pace of innovation, an e ective reallocation of resources, agile acquisition reform, reuse of existing NATO solutions, early engagement with industry, use of available commercial solutions and increased collaboration with partners should all be an integral part of NATO’s approach. NATO has embarked on an adaptation to ensure balance within its three core tasks (collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security). It will be a strategic challenge to address today’s crises while also planning and preparing for tomorrow’s threats and challenges. Resilient, modern IT infrastructure will be a necessary component for NATO to successfully tackle this challenge and underpin each of the three pillars of its adaptation: institutional, military and political. 2. Institutional Adaptation The aim of NATO’s institutional adaptation is to improve internal processes and procedures to better respond to a volatile security environment. Policy decision-makers do not fully appreciate the role of IT as a critical enabler supporting the Alliance’s political-military objectives. One of the greatest challenges ahead in 21st century information warfare is the pace of NATO’s technological adaptation. Global banks update their entire IT infrastructure rapidly and often; some quarterly. Their logic is a simple response to a non-static threat and is based on reality; they cannot a ord to have compromised networks. In this respect, NATO has to act very much like a bank: it cannot a ord to be compromised. Banks use technology incubators, in collaboration with the cyber industry, to increase mutual understanding in real time and to speed up and de-risk acquisition. Endorsed by the Alliance at its Wales Summit, the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP) has paved the way for collaboration with the private sector in addressing cyber threats. Through piloted incubators, NATO, industry and academia have worked together on de ning challenges and investigating innovative solutions in the areas of data fusion, cyber defence situational awareness and mobile security. With political will, a pilot scheme could become a permanent process. The institution of NATO, the various Headquarters and their sta s, enable decision making – enable the brain of NATO to decide on a course of action so the organs, muscle, bones and sinews of NATO can act. IT provides the nervous system. Robust and modern IT infrastructure provides the pathways for optimal decisions and actions, based on accurate, managed, prompt and properly ordered information. Through modernized IT, NATO has access to new levels of intelligence gathering, early warning, rapid decision-making and solutions to address the 10


p. 13

Volume XIII A Deep Insight threats and challenges emanating from a changed security landscape – a security landscape where both state and nonstate actors have unparalleled levels of access to global cyber space. We have seen rst-hand Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics, its e ective propaganda at home and in neighbouring countries, deployment of Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities stretching from Kaliningrad to the Black Sea, and a shift in its nuclear policy as part of a continuum of capabilities. The risks of miscalculation have risen. The means to minimize that miscalculation depend to a large extent on IT. Their e ectiveness must drive the priority and need for NATO to develop, acquire and implement the right IT capabilities if it wants to mitigate that risk. ”NATO is well aware of the technological advancements on the part of our potential state-based adversaries and also non-state actors, in the areas of both traditional military and hybrid capabilities. NATO as an organization and individual Allies need to be ever committed to maintaining our capability edge, including through continuous innovation, support to research and development and state-of- the art technology, to deliver on the Alliance’s three core tasks.” General Petr Pavel NATO acquires IT today through a waterfall model,1 no longer suitable for developing and acquiring IT capabilities needed to maintain a credible deterrence and readiness posture based on resilience. IT programs have a much shorter and more uid lifespan. If NATO wants to maintain its technological advantage thanks to its military capabilities, it needs to ensure its IT is robust and resilient enough to enable them. It will not do so if it continues to rely on traditional NATO acquisition models that are no longer suitable for capability development in the current security landscape. As threats develop apace, NATO must ensure its nervous systems is t for purpose, so that it can respond appropriately and bring to bear its technical advantage against those threats. The United States recognizes the importance of maintaining its edge in military technology and has launched a Defence Innovation Initiative known as its “third o set strategy” (3OS). The 3OS is a set of policies designed to harness new technological innovations and operational concepts so that the US can o set growing technological parity with its adversaries, thus maintaining its ability to project conventional power. Washington is keen to include its Allies in NATO as part of the 3OS: “All of us [NATO member states] together need to decide this innovation e ort is a priority or not; that is, a deliberate e ort. And we just can’t oat along the resource levels that the Alliance is giving to defense right now.” Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work2 The 3OS is a game-changing innovation and technology challenge, to ensure that the USA and Allies are equipped to stay ahead of their adversaries in acquiring and developing the latest solutions. This will bring increased levels of vulnerability to NATO’s network, which is why IT resilience must stay at the forefront of NATO’s priorities. 3. Military Adaptation Military adaptation to the new international security landscape aims at providing the Alliance with the right strategic capabilities, the right set of forces – trained and interoperable – and an e ective capability and defence planning, in a challenging international security environment. The ability to communicate and understand each other in a coalition where di erent standards are used is critical for any successful mission. Yet, in early May 2016, Dutch F-16 lacked satellite communication equipment for operational ights over Syria. The cost of non-interoperable radios is higher than ensuring interoperable standards between coalition forces in a mission environment. On today’s battle eld, the network links military assets in a manner never seen before, and now crucial to modern warfare. The e ective conduct of NATO operations could be compromised if not sustained by a robust, agile and secure NATO IT infrastructure to meet the challenges of the evolving security environment. NATO’s modern military operations – and extensively military capabilities – are becoming extensively netcentric. The network must be as good as, if not better than, the capabilities it supports if they are to be operationally e ective and deliver a combined tactical, operational or strategic e ect to win on a modern battle eld. 1 A waterfall model is a process model for capability development where each phase must be complete before the next phase can begin. It is most effective for small projects with little if any uncertainty. 2 Daniel Fiott (2016) Europe and the Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy. The RUSI Journal, 161:1, 26-31, DOI:10.1080/03071847.2016.1152118 continued ... 11


p. 14

A Deep Insight Vox Collegii •Georgia National Guard photo by Master Sgt. Gerard Brown VAZIANI TRAINING AREA, Tbilisi, Georgia Although net-centric operations pave the way for warfare in the 21st century, providing a new set of weapons, this also exposes states and international Organizations to emerging vulnerabilities that require a collective response: “Innovation and rapid technological development have changed the way we go to war. Our forces are linked together on data-rich networks that allow global command and control. These networks make Alliance forces more capable, but networks are vulnerable to attack, exploitation, and interruption. For that reason, the Alliance must recognize its strength (networks) could become its vulnerability. So, we must build an e ective and enduring shield for NATO's very nerve center, its IT domain.” Deputy Chairman NATO Military Committee, LtGen Mark O. Schissler The Alliance must take a holistic view of its IT infrastructure in connection with its kinetic systems. They cannot be considered as disconnected elements, but as part of a whole whose weaknesses must be addressed holistically to ensure its viability. The implementation of the assurance measures of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) has increased the number of exercises on the Eastern Flank of the Alliance. Every single NATO exercise has con rmed that the real challenge for the Alliance is enabling and reinforcing Command, Control, Consultation, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C4ISR) interoperability between national units and the NATO Force Structure at the tactical level. How e ective can NATO’s Deterrence and Defence posture be if its own enablers – the NATO Response Force, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR), Command and Control Capabilities, the Combat Service Support component, the NATO Command Structure, strategic awareness, hybrid and cyber warfare and strategic communications (StratCom) – are not able to operate as an integrated whole? IT and investing in IT, in a rapidly changing security environment, is paramount to ensure NATO’s network remains resilient so that it can operate as an integrated whole. Forces need to be able to interact, connect, communicate, and exchange data and services through interoperable equipment. This is most evident in the challenge NATO will face when it tries 12


p. 15

Volume XIII A Deep Insight to integrate, at the tactical level, its Spearhead Forces, followon forces and Host Nation forces. This will involve multinational brigades and sub-units from the militaries of many nations who, in many cases, are each using di erent radio standards, encryption systems, and even languages. NATO, the institution, must tackle this challenge head-on so that NATO nations and their industries can close this interoperability gap. Afghanistan provided an unprecedented interoperability laboratory that allowed NATO Allies and partners to work together in an operational environment. Today, Federated Mission Networking (FMN) leverages the success achieved in ISAF and represents a key contribution to the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), helping Allied and partner forces to better communicate, train and operate together, enhancing interoperability and information sharing. FMN is a capability supporting the command and control and decision-making in future operations, through improved information sharing. It provides the agility, exibility and scalability to respond to emerging requirements of any mission environment in future NATO operations, delivering cost-e ectiveness and promoting the maximum reuse of existing standards and capabilities. Future mission networks with an FMN stamp will signi cantly reduce the interoperability gap between coalition partners. NATO’s members closest to potential adversaries are highlighting the need for greater Deterrence and Defence and committing to play their part: “As Framework Nation for the NATO Force Integration Unit and the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, we are committed to help deter and defend against any threats to the Alliance’s security, which is our goal. Solid IT is critical for resilience, as modern IT warfare can cause massive disruptions to our networks. It is paramount that everyone, including policymakers, recognizes supreme IT as NATO’s nervous system.” Polish Military Representative to NATO, LtGen Andrzej Fałkowski Budgets remain tight, but there are options within these constraints. NATO First Solutions (N1S) contributes to preserving and leveraging the level of interoperability acquired in a coalition environment, through seamless integration with existing NATO capabilities, avoiding redevelopment costs, implementation, support and training on diverse systems delivering equivalent capabilities. N1S helps Nations guarantee interoperability, ensure cost-e ectiveness, reduce complexity https://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/3268871691/in/photolist-arHcFj-7t7YnW7HbTME-6PBzj7-7oEd7H-5SSAhx-5CYyZ5-4LKdLt-5YW2PN-5YRPEK-7H7YtB-2S5NLu- 4ZUMRk-5UaoiJ NCO Academy Teaches Leadership in Virtual Environment 19 Statement by the North Atlantic Council on incursions into Turkey’s airspace by Russian aircraft, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_123392.htm?selectedLocale=en 20 A brief account can be nd at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/2015/10/08/ nato-secretary-general-ready-send-troops-turkey/73572460/ continued ... 13



no comments yet