Vox Collegii Vol XI


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CONTENTS: EDITORIAL 2 THE COMMANDANT’S CORNER 3 A DEEP INSIGHT: 'Support and in uence': a strategy of choice for the 21st century by Scott Morrison 4 Alarming for neighbours and domestic opposition: the new Russian military doctrine by Heidi Reisinger Editor-in-chief: LtCol Alberto Alletto (ITA A) 10 Civil-military interaction — a bridge too far for NATO? by Philippe von Burg 13 Editor: Michalina Seliga (POL C) LIFE AT THE COLLEGE: Assistant Editor: Francisco J.Marin-Barrena (ESP C) International Kyiv Week 2015 22 Proof-reading: Caroline Curta (FRA C) Peter G. Mead (GBR C) NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats by Je rey Larsen and Lorenzo Bettelli 24 Photography: NDC Reproductions Section NATO website USA Armed Forces websites Wikimedia HIGHLIGHTS: Our Courses 26 Graphic Design & Printing: Gra ch Communication S.r.l. (Fondi -LT-) Our Guests 30 Our Publications 33


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Editorial Vox Collegii Dear Reader, Welcome once more to a new issue of Vox Collegii. Since we last went to press, the College has been to the fore in a number of exciting academic initiatives. Working in such an environment is a great source of motivation for your editorial team, always eager to share news and critical insights with you. In May, I was privileged to attend the inaugural lecture of the Generals, Flag O cers and Ambassadors Course (GFOAC 2015-1). Professor Christopher Coker (GBR) gave an inspiring talk, entitled “Cultural Dialogue: the Western Encounter with the Rest”. What I see as the core issue of this topic is the question of whether meaningful cross-cultural debate is possible at all: NATO proves that it is not only possible, but enlightening and bene cial to all concerned. A mainstay of the NATO Defense College’s activity is our rm commitment to ensuring that cross-cultural debate continues to ourish. Vox Collegii and our social accounts contribute greatly in this respect, a ording a space where readers can share their suggestions and comments. Here at the NDC, we believe that constructive criticism provides an essential basis for the setting of new qualitative standards. The successful conclusion of the “Defeating Hybrid Threats” conference provides a clear measure of the College’s vital contribution to conceptual and practical knowledge of the most topical concerns, but this does not mean that we can rest on our laurels. I see it as a starting point for sustained discussion, helping achieve the necessary focus thoughout the build-up to next year’s Warsaw Summit and hopefully providing a conceptual framework that will prove viable for many years to come. The need for communication is crucial in this respect, especially in response to the challenges we touch on in this edition of Vox Collegii: the geopolitics of emotion, as practised by Russia, and the Allies’ need to achieve an appropriate civil-military balance and further enhance cooperation. Since last year, Russian aggression against Ukraine has involved deception, deployment of proxy soldiers, unmarked special forces, undercover transfers of equipment, intimidation and propaganda. Hybrid war as a phenomenon is nothing new, but we still need to improve our situational awareness – not only on the operational level, but (even more important, from an Alliance perspective) in terms of the broader picture. In this regard, the role of the NATO Defense College is to prepare minds to fully understand the world we live in. We need to make clear that war is no solution. It is a short cut for those who have invested above all in hard power. The aw in such a vision is that it is illusory: far from accomplishing important goals more quickly, war merely brings violence and destruction or, at the very least, leads to the ostracism and isolation of the aggressor. Ensuring that this precept is clearly understood is an essential step towards safeguarding worldwide peace and security. Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Alletto Italian Army, Head Public A airs O ce 2


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Volume XI The Commandant’s Corner nother year of innovative input and discussion on a broad range of topics has come to a successful conclusion. Over the last six months, the NATO Defense College (NDC) has striven to respond rapidly to the uncertain and dynamic nature of the international environment through a variety of academic activities and research. It was an honour for me to open one of the most important events hosted by the NATO Defense College: the international conference entitled ‘NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats’. The Conference, which was held on 29-30 April 2015, focused on “hybrid warfare” tactics, as used especially on NATO’s Eastern and Southern anks, and the strategies required to counter this threat. The high numbers in attendance at this agship event prove once again that the NDC is playing a fundamental role as NATO’s premier academic institution. A One of my future objectives will be to organize other equally relevant conferences at the College, which I consider to be ideally suited for discussions and exchanges of views on specialized, contemporary issues, such as those dealt with during the April conference. In addition, over the last few months, I have focused my attention on the NDC Review, which raised two matters linked to the NDC’s prime function as the Alliance’s cornerstone for higher military education. The rst is related to the academic validation of the NDC’s Senior Course by each national institution, while the second involves ensuring recognition for the Senior Course as a distinct Master’s degree, with a number of necessary exams to be taken for certi cation purposes. I am deeply committed to bringing these two challenges to fruition; they represent compelling innovations for our prestigious College and I have, consequently, requested the Dean to look at possible solutions in order to reach both targets. Furthermore, I recently attended the Conference of Commandants (CoC), an annual meeting for the Chiefs of military educational institutions; this year the forum was held in the capital of one of our signi cant Partner countries, Austria, from 28 to 30 June, and I took this opportunity to share my ideas about the validation and recognition of the Senior Course. Considering that education is a crucial eld which connects all higher defence establishments, I was able to listen to valuable and constructive opinions on this subject. In conclusion, in line with the input received at the CoC, I shall be strongly supporting all the necessary e orts to add value to the NDC and guarantee its continuing success. Major General Janusz Bojarski Polish Air Force, NDC Commandant 3


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A Deep Insight Vox Collegii ‘Support and in uence’: A strategy of choice for the twenty- rst century Scott Morrison Security in the West has been severely jeopardized by Russia’s seizure of Crimea and the ongoing subversive activity in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s actions are the latest demonstration of an increasingly prevalent way of waging war in the Information Age. Provision of training, advice and assistance to local indigenous forces by an intervening nation has been traditionally viewed as a peripheral military undertaking, rather than a strategy of rst choice to achieve military ends. Military institutions understandably view the purpose of armed forces as the conduct of wars, the application of force being the principal means of defeating an adversary. A shortcoming of this perspective is that training and consultancy come to be seen as intermittent, ancillary tasks which distract from the core pro ciencies required to conduct combat operations. However, given the unconventional challenges facing the military in the twenty- rst century, a strategy of supporting indigenous elements by training, advice and other forms of assistance (as opposed to committing large numbers of forces in a direct combat role) is in most cases the most viable way of using force for purposes of military coercion. In the strategy framework of ends, ways and means, enabling local forces is the ‘way’ of the foreseeable future. 1.1 De ning a strategy of ‘support and in uence’ A strategy of ‘support and in uence’ is one in which an intervening third party to a con ict assists indigenous military, paramilitary, police, or other forces with recruitment, organization, training, equipment and other forms of support. The indigenous force is leveraged as a proxy or surrogate, in order to prevail over another belligerent through the threat or use of force. This support and assistance can take the form of o ensive or defence-related aid, by lethal and or non-lethal means, and can be provided in an overt, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine manner. Such a strategy could take the form of training and advising a host nation force faced with lawlessness, insurgency, or subversion; developing indigenous security forces in a stabilization role following regime change; or rendering assistance to an insurgent or resistance force seeking to overthrow a government or achieve related aims. Essentially, the strategy focuses upon enabling the capability and capacity of other elements, and providing support ranging from strategic information and diplomatic e orts all the way to tactical-level assistance with such issues as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and medical support. The intervening party that assists indigenous forces can also provide advice and assistance in varying degrees through forward physical presence, and remotely through technological or third party conduits. Provision of advice and assistance allows the intervening party to shape the application of force by the indigenous element, and thus better assure the achievement of the desired ends. In a ‘support and in uence’ strategy, the central e ort is focused on enabling an indigenous force. Other lines of operation, as well as other assets and enabling Scott Morrison currently serves as the Director of the Commander’s Action Group (CAG) at the NSHQ in Mons, Belgium. Mr Morrison began his career as a US Army Ranger, serving 20 years in the United States Army. From May 2005 to May 2006 he was in Iraq as senior advisor to the Commander, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Infantry Division; he completed his service on the Army Sta in the Pentagon, focusing on Special Operations issues. Presently, Mr Morrison is pursuing a PhD through a distance learning agreement with Leiden University in the Netherlands. He holds an MA in Defence Studies from King’s College, University of London; an MA in Military Science in Unconventional Warfare, from the American Military University; and a BSc in Engineering within Military Studies, from West Point Military Academy. Mr Morrison is also a graduate of the United Kingdom’s Joint Services Command and Sta College. The opinions expressed in this article are his own and must not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 4


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Volume XI A Deep Insight Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operator U.S. Air Force Copyright, http://www.airforce.com/careers/detail/airborne-intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance-operator/ capabilities, are employed as support elements. However, participation in direct combat operations by the ground forces of the intervening nation, beyond the presence of advisors accompanying local forces, is not part of such a strategy. Introduction of combat forces by an outside third party usurps the strategic initiative and responsibility of indigenous forces; this also undermines the advantages of local knowledge and of experience with the terrain, culture, languages, tribes and adversaries, which provide a setting for locally derived solutions. 1.2 An indirect approach against a backdrop of netwar The words of military theorist Liddell Hart resonate ever more clearly in today's international security environment, especially following a decade of troubled interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan: ‘... throughout the ages decisive results in war have only been reached when the approach has been indirect. In strategy the longest way round is apt to be the shortest way home.’1 One could argue that a concerted e ort to recruit, organize, train, equip, advise and assist Iraqi and Afghan security forces, as the central element of a strategy implemented from the outset and with a coherent long-term plan over the course of a decade, could have achieved the desired ends more e ectively and e ciently. The central premise to the indirect approach is to throw an adversary o balance.2 Hart described a direct approach, without the preparatory shaping of an indirect lead, as a blunt and raw approach that typically achieves an adverse outcome and results in exhaustion following the expenditure of a great deal of futile e ort.3 A strategy of ‘support and in uence’, utilizing training, advice and assistance, is the modern-day manifestation of the indirect approach, particularly against the backdrop of what was rst described by John Arquilla and David Rondfelt as ‘netwar’ in a 1996 RAND monograph.4 Arquilla and Rondfelt tellingly compared warfare in the Information Age to the Chinese board game ‘Go’, and war in the past to a traditional chessboard, providing a dramatic illustration of the di erences between the two.5 The authors’ prediction of this paradigm shift 1 Hart (1941), Strategy of the Indirect Approach, Faber and Faber Limited, p. 4. 2 Ibid., p. 5. 3 Ibid., p. 5. 5 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997), ‘A New Epoch and Spectrum of Con ict’ , in "In Athena’s Camp, Preparing for the Con ict in the Information Age", RAND, p.163. 4 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996), The Advent of Netwar, RAND, pp. 5-16. continued ... 5


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A Deep Insight Vox Collegii U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Venessa Hernandez https://www.flickr.com/photos/soldiersmediacenter/14995638719/ for war is particularly instructive in relation to today’s extremely complex security environment, in the light of recent events in Ukraine and the constantly tightening constraints on defence budgets. Arquilla and Ronfeldt stated that war would be about distributing assets, not massing them, in pursuit of positional advantage.6 Networking of stationary nodes and assets was seen as more important than combined operations with specialized assets in defence of a hierarchical architecture.7 In other words, the goal is no longer to prevail through attrition of an adversary’s forces by removing pieces from the board. Most importantly, Arquilla and Ronfeldt note that: ‘there is often a blurring of o ense and defense – a single move may both attack and defend simultaneously.’8 This contrasts with chess, in which o ensive and defensive actions are more apparent, and massed concentrations of assets are advantageous.9 What this perspective underlines is positional defence of 6 Ibid. interests via networked relationships, as opposed to defence of physical territory. It is in this way that a ‘support and in uence’ strategy can enable an indirect approach, i.e. upsetting an enemy’s balance by leveraging local forces rather than directly confronting him. The development of these local forces allows for their proactive insertion and presence in and around the interests of an adversary, at well-de ned points of vulnerability. As stated by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, ‘It is more about deciding where to stand than whether to advance or retreat.’10 A strategy of ‘support and in uence’ contributes incrementally to a decisive result. Larger local forces, empowered with indigenous knowledge and information, advice, assistance and communications systems, are capable of ‘swarming’11 the enemy’s points of vulnerability. Most importantly, a ‘support and in uence’ strategy does not necessarily require engagement and the use of force to achieve the desired e ect; it could rely upon the potential use of force and on Sun Tzu’s ‘sheathed sword’ stratagem.12 Ultimately, this produces an e ect or outcome that is grossly disproportionate to the means or resources invested in the strategy. 10 Ibid. 11 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996), The Advent of Netwar, RAND, p. 57. 12 Tzu (6th Century BC), The Art of War, Delacorte Press, p. 16. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996), The Advent of Netwar, RAND, pp. 5-16. 6


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Volume XI A Deep Insight 1.3 A comprehensive, integrated long-term ‘support and in uence’ strategy The interdependent nature of security challenges such as organized crime, narcotics, terrorism and insurgency inevitably lends itself to strategies that develop indigenous capabilities and capacities. As a result, the application of a successful ‘support and in uence’ strategy must not be compartmentalized and restricted to speci c ‘micro’ aspects of the overall e ort. We know in principle, from successful counterinsurgencies, that a holistic, integrated approach is required between the civilian side and the military, i.e. a comprehensive and fully integrated approach. Here again, the Russian example is a case in point: conventional manoeuvring and exercises on multiple fronts were complemented by o ensive information operations, enabling local forces in a well-orchestrated strategic approach. E orts in Afghanistan and Iraq give an idea of the possible outcome when these e orts are poorly integrated. Inevitably, the security situation on the ground drove military forces to focus on an attritional campaign against opposing forces that are visible and can therefore be targeted. In such a setting, the prerequisite for extricating international forces from both these con icts rested principally with competent and capable indigenous security forces, bolstered by supporting institutions. The division of command and control structures between the US and the international coalition, as well as the initially ‘enemy-centric’ focus of the campaign, signi cantly retarded the development and implementation of a ‘support and in uence’ strategy. In actual practice, a patchwork of episodic and disjointed e orts developed in the various elds concerned (military, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, command and control, logistics, communications, etc.). If the strategic objective does not include a long-term physical presence of the intervening force on the ground, this presupposes that some local entity must safeguard what has been achieved. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan https://www.flickr.com/photos/ntm-a_cstc-a/8073049436/ continued ... 7


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A Deep Insight Vox Collegii Afghan Police train with Italian Carabinieri advisors from NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan U.S. Navy photo by Chief Petty Officer Brian Brannon https://www.flickr.com/photos/ntm-a_cstc-a/5037937387/ Unfortunately, though, provision of advice and assistance to make this possible is rarely employed as the strategy of choice from the outset. The focus of advice and assistance must not be limited to military, paramilitary, or police forces. In all elds, the key is to ensure indigenous solutions enabled with outside assistance, rather than externally driven solutions to complex problems that in many cases are simply not fully comprehensible by outsiders. The positive impact of such an approach is complemented by signi cant safeguarding of lives, nancial and political capital, and legitimacy. 1.4 Why a ‘support and in uence’ strategy? A rst consideration is that, as already mentioned, traditional military tools can do very little to address twenty- rst century threats and challenges. Outside intervention and direct participation as a belligerent in combat operations are clearly not suitable ways of countering asymmetric threats. Strategies of annihilation, exhaustion, attrition, survival, containment, isolation, decapitation and control cannot be successful when dealing with regular and irregular forces in failed states, insurgents, terrorists or non-state actors.13 Counterinsurgency and stability operations undertaken by the international community in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade are prime illustrations of this. Some observers describe ‘support and in uence’ as a means to accomplish more with less, or 'a strategic model for […] new age austerity’.14 Certainly, one of the advantages of such a strategy is that it minimizes expenditure of resources. Ultimately, its value should not be as a fallback option. It must be applied from the outset, with the desired end-state in mind. 13 De Wijk (2005), The Art of Military Coercion: Why the West's Military Superiority Scarcely Matters, Mets & Schilt, pp. 98-123. 14 Malkasian and Weston (March/April 2012), War Downsized: How to Accomplish More With Less, Foreign A airs, p. 114.12 Tzu (6th Century BC), The Art of War, Delacorte Press, p. 16. 8


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Volume XI A Deep Insight Because seeking to apply force via a surrogate or proxy is perceived in traditional military cultures as unorthodox, it is rarely viewed as a stand-alone solution to a problem requiring the application of force. However, close prior assessment would in most cases show a positive return on the investment made. When compared to direct intervention and the associated expenditure of national resources and capital in dealing with complex civil con ict, a strategy of ‘support and in uence’ makes eminently good sense. Such an approach is at times unattractive because it requires a patient, long-term strategic vision. Advice and assistance can rarely provide an immediate panacea. Consistent e orts will achieve long-term sustainable results over time, whereas e orts driven by short-term perspectives on a crisis will in most cases create temporary results. 1.5 Whither a strategy of ‘support and in uence’? A ‘support and in uence’ strategy is applicable against state and non-state actors, conventional as well as illicit networked threats. It is an inherently adaptable strategy that adopts a long-term, patient, nuanced approach to challenges, rather than direct military intervention and the commitment of ground forces to combat operations. The question remains, however, as to whether military and defence establishments will begin to acknowledge ‘support and in uence’ as a rst-choice, bona de military strategy requiring a comprehensive and integrated long-term campaign construct, or will continue to practice it on an ad hoc basis. ‘Support and in uence’ has not yet achieved such recognition. Until it enters into the mainstream of military strategic thought, it will unfortunately not be o ered to decision-makers in a coherent manner as a potential solution to the complex challenges and threats faced in this century. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visits Train, Advise and Assist Command (TAAC) West in Herat. Welcome by Brigadier General Maurizio Angelo Scardino, Commander TAAC-W, November 7, 2014 Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/nato/15733201462 9


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A Deep Insight Vox Collegii Alarming for neighbours and domestic opposition: the new Russian military doctrine by Heidi Reisinger The new version of Russia’s military doctrine appeared quietly during the (Western) Christmas holidays on the website of the Kremlin, only in the original Russian version without translation, and with minimal media exposure. The expected rhetorical and media-driven show of force did not happen. So much secrecy raises interest in this basically boring document. At rst glance, it hardly di ers from its predecessor from 2010: a kind of preamble with all sorts of platitudes and de nitions, followed by a list of military dangers and threats, and chapters with possible policy- and technology-based answers. Russian documents of this kind have always o ered at best limited information to the outside observer, as the Russian president will not consult with the doctrine before he sends “little green men” or entire units into a neighbouring country. These documents are often totally overloaded, so that anything and everything can be read into them. Furthermore, they are not free from internal contradictions. But at least they serve as a basis for legitimacy, both outside and inside Russia, with a view to justifying military action. This doctrine is quite restrained in tone (no open agitation against the West), but also makes very gloomy reading, as global threats have intensi ed and dangers lurk everywhere, including the militarization of space. However, among the many platitudes there is also substance. Ignoring the notion that, from the perspective of many states, Russia itself is again becoming a threat to European security, then at least three important trends can be distilled from the new military doctrine. First, military hazards within Russia are given greater prominence than before. It’s not just about “Islamism” or “terrorism”, but unrest and internal disintegration instigated and orchestrated from abroad hence the talk of “in uencing the (Russian) population, especially young people, to undermine the goal of the historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions of the defence of the fatherland”. There are several references in this direction, which send an unmistakable signal to the Russian people. Public protest, as in 2011 and 2012 after the manipulated Duma elections and the Medvedev/Putin tandem exchange, let alone a Russian “Maidan”, will not be tolerated. Following this logic, similar scenarios in the states geographically closest to Russia are considered a signi cant threat. Such developments must be nipped in the bud by any conceivable means, even military. The second important trend to be considered concerns Russia-NATO relations. Unlike previous versions of the military doctrine, there is no mention here of cooperation with the Alliance, only of a “dialogue on an equal footing”. NATO was previously seen (along with the United States) as a source of military danger. Now it is seen as the source. However, it is not given threat status, as expected by some observers; on the other hand, though, one threat identi ed in the document is Heidi Reisinger is a Research Advisor and Senior Analyst at the NATO Defense College in Rome. Her area of expertise includes Russia and Central Asia, and NATO’s Partnership Policy. She has in the past led the Russia desk at the German MoD and served on the sta of the Foreign and Security Policy Advisor to German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Her articles and commentaries have also appeared in Zeitschrift für Aussenund Sicherheitspolitik (ZSAF), Cicero, Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Washington Post. This article is the revised version of an oped article in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on 19 February 2015 The opinions expressed in this article are her own and must not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 10


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Volume XI A Deep Insight Moscow Victory Day Parade 2013. Source: Wikimedia Picture: Vitaly V. Kuzmin http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/04/2013_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_%2808%29.jpg the “demonstration of military force with military exercises in Russia's neighbouring states and its allies”. This formulation is actually reminiscent of Russia’s own “snap exercises” at the Ukrainian border. Here, however, the tables are turned and the reference is clearly to multilateral exercises involving NATO members and partners in the Baltic States, Poland and Western Ukraine. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the largest land grab since the Second World War, it seems absurd to associate NATO’s perceived expansion with a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia. The main point that emerges here is Russia's need for bu er states, e ectively denying neighbouring states full sovereign power. The third topic of interest is Russia's choice of allies and partners. Given the clear curtailment of dialogue with NATO and the EU, the doctrine places emphasis on intensi ed cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Russiadominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the other four BRICS (Brazil, India, China, South Africa). In terms of Russia’s allies, only Belarus and the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are directly mentioned. Of course, there is no mention of the fact that Abkhazia and South Ossetia have not been recognized by any of the aforementioned partners. With this doctrine, the Russian leadership has turned its back on cooperation with Western partners and is working on the creation of alternatives. It perpetuates the myth that Russia could compensate the ruined partnership with Europe and America with new partners in Asia. The document, therefore, advocates a “non-aligned security architecture in the Asia-Paci c region” and the protection of Russian interests in the Arctic. Ukraine itself – let alone the war there – is not mentioned. However, the references to the threat of new, mixed methods of warfare and the importance of (dis)information campaigns provide an accurate re ection of Russia’s actions in Crimea and continued ... 11


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A Deep Insight Vox Collegii Moscow Victory Day Parade 2013 source: Wikimedia Picture: Vitaly V. Kuzmin http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a5/2013_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_%2830%29.jpg Eastern Ukraine. This Russian military doctrine sends a warning to potential critics inside Russia, and especially to its direct neighbours. For NATO and the West, Russia is no longer just a di cult partner, which is nevertheless interested in common security and stability, but seems to have become an increasingly isolated and unpredictable state, whose authoritarian regime is ghting for its own survival. 12


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Volume XI A Deep Insight Civil-Military interaction - a bridge too far for NATO? by Philippe von Burg Do NATO soldiers engage properly with their non-military counterparts? Or is the Alliance too militarized to interact with civilians e ectively? Philippe von Burg was a Research Fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome from September to December 2014 and is a civilian at the Swiss Department of Defense. He had earlier served as political adviser and policy analyst in the Balkans. Previously he co-founded a New York City-based advisory and management rm, specializing in frontier and crisis markets. His focus was on the politicseconomics-security intersection and high-level management in political and security contexts. He researched and spoke on issues of international security, post-con ict reconstruction, foreign direct investment, illicit political economies, public-private partnerships, and civil-military a airs. Mr von Burg previously held senior positions in the international commercial sector and was a supporter to civil society and economic advocacy groups in North America and Switzerland. He has studied engineering, economics, humanities and security policy in Switzerland, France, the UK and the United States. The opinions expressed in this article are his own and must not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With NATO’s growing geographic reach and full-spectrum capabilities, civilmilitary interaction (CMI) will be increasingly critical to its e cacy. To a large degree, its success depends on the role of civil organizations and partners. According to NATO doctrine, these include national civil administrations, host nation civil administrations, various political bodies, international organizations, governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, global economic bodies, and populations themselves. NATO’s intent to not only develop new partnerships but also optimize their e ect and quality is thus an important consideration. Civil-military policy is ambiguous, the structure ine ective, and operations lack political guidance. At a 2012 conference co-organized by ACT and SHAPE,1 experts agreed that NATO’s comprehensive approach needed a reset in order to improve the civilian-military interface, particularly at the political and strategic levels. The Alliance subscribes to the “comprehensive approach to crisis management at the political and strategic, operational, and theatre/tactical levels”. Related NATO guidance consists of the Strategic Concept 2010, Allied Joint Doctrine, Military Policy on CIMIC and CMI, as well as the CIMIC Doctrine.2 Whereas theatre/tactical CIMIC is well de ned, the political-strategic CMI is incomplete and lacks focus. De nition of terms3 Comprehensive approach CA The comprehensive approach is a civilian-led e ort across the spectrum of con ict and disaster relief missions, embedded within a exible institutional and organizational framework that better enables collaboration and thus sequences with a determined focus on the needs of the a ected populations.4 It involves political, civilian and military instruments by international, regional and local actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities, in order to maximize coherence and e ectiveness of the overall e ort. As such, the comprehensive approach is the internal and external coordination of all available instruments and actors, their timely and appropriate 1 Julian Lindley-French and William Hopkins, “Operationalising the comprehensive approach”, Wilton Park Conference Report 1092 (2012), www.wiltonpark.org.uk (accessed September 2014). 2 Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Active Engagement, Modern Defence, 2010; NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, 2010; NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and CivilMilitary Interaction (CMI), 2014; NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation, 2013. 3 Based on the literature and practitioner assessments. Not all sources are explicitly referenced. 4 Julian Lindley-French and William Hopkins, “Operationalising the comprehensive approach”. continued ... 13



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